

Now it can be shown that a pattern of bombing away any opportunity for peace has been the consistent policy of the Johnson government ever since the great overtures for peace in the summer of 1964 when Johnson first ordered a bombing of the North. The bombing of the North grew out of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Ostensibly this incident involved an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the U.S. destroyers, Maddox and Turner Joy. The question of whether such attacks occurred at all still rages:

Washington, Feb. 21 (UPI).--Sen. J. William Fullbright (D., Ark.) charged Wednesday- and the Defense Department denied- that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara had suppressed information strongly suggesting U.S. destroyers were not attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin incident. (The Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 22, 1968.)

Here again we see action where no action may have been called for. To consider action where there should be none expected, it is an interesting commentary upon the ability of our government to be moved into action, when we consider Oswald was wanted before we can show he was legitimately identified, and the military assured us of no conspiracy before the lone assassin was even charged with killing the President. We know now that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was drafted by Bundy before the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

The Unpolitical Johnson- A Military Idealist

Why did President Johnson not take advantage of opportunities for peace talks on Vietnam? He would not have lost face. On the

contrary, regarding him as the vain, egotistical politician that he is, he would have reaped gigantic political rewards, on the assumption we are a democracy. The following headlines which are but a brief sample, reveal this:

"War Could 'Bury' Democrats: Galbraith" - (New York Post, April, 3, 1967.)

"Poll Calls Vietnam Johnson's Liability" - (New York Times, June 20, 1967.)

"President Hurt by Viet War" - (New York Times, March 12, 1967.)

"Johnson Defeat in 1968 Feared by Democrats -

...War Stalemate Blamed" - (The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 6, 1967.)

And Carl Rowan asserted:

"...simple logic says the President cannot possibly gain from having the war drag on, so he has got to want peace in Vietnam almost as much as he wants to go on living..." (The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, December 7, 1966.)

Yet, the record clearly indicates opportunities for peace have not been reacted to, and that does raise the question of why not? In the past, in situations where we got into trouble - in Lebanon, Quemoy and Matsu, or Berlin, for example - and we seemed close to war - the Chief Executive would back off. But there has not been the slightest backing off in the post Kennedy Vietnam situation, not even in response to popular demand. At first the President enshrined the ideal of consensus, but was unmoved when he was acting without consensus. Now the President has apparently been reduced by Vietnam from a powerful consensus President to a military errand boy.

We cannot explain this war on the aims or dynamic of a democratic society, but it makes perfect sense in terms of a garrison state--a military society. What we who awaken in this dangerous situation must ask is when did the military gain control? If it makes most sense to explain our action in Vietnam in military categories, and the very inevitability of the escalation certainly makes it seem that we must so explain it, when did the military come into power? They weren't there in that utterly dominant sense before the assassination, and they were after.

In trying to explain the Vietnam war we are led back to the assassination. Of course, perhaps it is only coincidence. One really hopes so, but there has been so much left to an explanation in terms of coincidence since the assassination. In rejecting the idea this is a universe of chance, Einstein once said he did not believe God would play dice with the universe. In the case of the assassination and the war it doesn't seem God is playing dice either--it seems the military have loaded the dice. Mankind had better beware. They are exploding dice.

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CONSPIRACY TO KILL JFK - ITS MEANING

THE CONSPIRACY TO KILL J.F.K.-IIIS. MEANING

This article is designed to explore the meaning of the Kennedy assassination. We examine preliminarily the Federal government's over reaction to the concept of Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin even before evidence developed in support of this official thesis. Also, we trace the Federal government's consistent refusal to entertain conspiracy evidence. We demonstrate how the Federal authorities remained married to an untenable single assassin theory, although conspiracy evidence poured into them immediately after the assassination.

Dallas police behavior, in terms of initially gathering evidence in support of conspiracy, and only later conforming to the federally originated concept of Oswald as the lone assassin, we deal with only briefly. Let it suffice to say that the Dallas police behavior has been documented in other critical assassination studies. For the present we merely assert that the Dallas police behaved in a manner consistent with initial innocence of the major body of police in the killing of President Kennedy. The very inconsistency of the Dallas police, as counterposed to the deadly consistency of the federal authorities, supports initial innocence of the major part of the Dallas police force.

The latter portion of this article states a model of explanation for the assassination. The model explains the assassination in terms of motivation. We conclude that the evidence supports the concept that the assassination was used to militarize foreign policy and perpetuate the Cold War against the underdeveloped peoples.

The Warren Report- Myth Generation

To take seriously Warren Commission conclusions concerning physical evidence relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy one need only refuse to take seriously Newtonian laws of the physical universe. We are told by the Warren Commission that the fatal shot which struck Kennedy's skull came from the School Depository Building, or from in back of him. Yet, Kennedy was not driven forward by this bullet smashing him from behind. In defiance of laws of physics, he instead was driven to the side, leftward, and backward, and was slammed off the back seat of the Presidential limousine into his wife's arms. Such propulsion of the Kennedy body and head was consistent only with a shot aimed from the right and in front of him.

The Commission's straining of logic and its blatant evasion of evidence in order to support a lone assassin theory represents consistent official behavior from the very onset. Indeed, if certain Commission conclusions were in violation of Newtonian laws of physics, a variation on the theme of those laws governing behavioral patterns of officials may be clearly detected.

Wherever evidence of a conspiracy with respect to the assassination has surfaced, the federal government, from the very first, refused to act. Wherever any suggestion of evidence supported the concept of Oswald as the assassin, the Federal government overly reacted in deeming such data veracious. Analysis of this pattern of official inaction and over reaction leads one to a compelling conclusion of official guilt. The pattern is too studied, too consistent and too persistent to be compatible with mere bureaucratic stupidity or accident. If the assassination had been a script for the Theater of the Absurd, perhaps it could be understood, but it was reality- a tragic reality.

Amid the shock, grief and horror of the first reactions to Kennedy's brutal murder a question which had to weigh heavy upon us all concerned who killed him, and why. An amazingly quick solution was in the possession of the military- too quick! If one wishes to see lightning quick action where in fact no action is justified, the scene is Air Force One en route from Dallas to Washington.

Pulitzer prize winner, Theodore H. White, in his book, The Making of the President 1964,¹ has recorded the making of history for us, and in so doing makes us raise some crucially important questions. He informs us:

"There is a tape-recording in the archives of the government which best recaptures the sound of the horrors as it waited for leadership. It is a recording of all the conversations in the air, monitored by the Signal Corps Midwestern center "Liberty," between Air Force One in Dallas, the Cabinet plane over the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs Communications center in Washington. The voices were superbly flat, calm, controlled...one receives the ETA- 6:00 P.M. Washington. It is a meshing of emotionless voices in the air, performing with mechanical perfection..." (p.20)

Later, we are further illuminated by White with the following statement:

"On the flight the party learned that there was no conspiracy, learned of the identity of Oswald and his arrest; and the President's mind turned to the duties of consoling the stricken and guiding the quick." (p.48)

On the contrary, it would seem the quick were guiding the President. "Flat, calm, controlled, emotionless voices" knowing before six o'clock on November 22, 1963 there was no conspiracy! That's a bit too much. Are we to believe it was already known Oswald was the lone assassin? If so, that would surely have been an impressive understanding of what happened since Oswald was not even charged with assassinating the President until

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1. White, Theodore H., The Making of the President, 1964, p. 20. New York, Atheneum, 1965.

1:30 A.M. the next morning. Indeed, at a press conference held at midnight on the 22nd, Oswald upon being asked if he had killed the president, responded that he had not even been charged with that.¹

On November 23, 1963, the Dallas Morning News informed us that according to Henry Wade: "...preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved in the shooting...the electric chair is too good for the killers." If preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved, how could the military have been so certain so early there had been no conspiracy? In volume one of the 26 volumes of Hearings and Exhibits, Mrs. Oswald is quoted as asserting: "So we waited quite a while. One of the men came by and said, 'I am sorry that we are going to be delayed in letting you see Lee, but we have picked up another suspect.'"² This was on Saturday at noon!!

Can there be any doubt that for any taken by surprise by the assassination, and legitimately seeking the truth concerning this, sometime prior to six o'clock on the day of the assassination was too soon to know there was no conspiracy. Unless White is wrong in what he relates to us concerning this, and he failed to acknowledge error in a note to Salandria, the notification of "no conspiracy" assumes a major importance, coming as early as it did. What is startling about this tape is that it represents the first memorialization of the lone assassin myth. This premature birth of the Oswald myth came sans benefit of sufficient gestation period to have been the product of any legitimate intercourse between the American military (the author's of the tape and apparently of the myth) and the assassination evidence. Its importance caused Salandria to expend much effort in trying to procure

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1. Lane, Mark, Rush to Judgment, p. 81, Conn: Fawcett Publications Inc., 1966.
2. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Vol. 1, p. 149. United States Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1964. References to the Hearing Notes and the Commission Exhibits are designated by the volume number, an "H," followed by a page number.

the transcript.

The Search for the Crucial Tape

Dr. Robert H. Bahmer, Archivist of the United States, wrote to Salandria on November 20, 1967 that Mr. T. H. White was wrong in his contention that there is a tape in the Archives which contains the contents of the communication between Air Force One and the White House Situation Room. Dr. Bahmer advised:

"We have no knowledge of the existence or location of the tape recording mentioned by Mr. White, despite having made some efforts since the receipt of your letter to obtain some information about it."

At this point Salandria switched his appeal to Mr. Pierre Salinger. In Mr. Salinger's book, With Kennedy,¹ he made mention of radio communication with the White House and the cabinet plane over the Pacific on November 22, 1963. Mr. Salinger's voice is recorded on the tape menticed by T.H. White. So it is clear that the tape was a recording of a three-way conversation among the White House Situation Room through the voice of Major Harold R. Patterson, the Presidential plane, Air Force One (returning to Washington from Dallas), and the Cabinet plane over the Pacific.

Salandria pointed out to Mr. Salinger the significance of the Pentagon announcement that Oswald was the lone assassin:

"If such was said, before there was any evidence against Oswald as the assassin, and while there was overwhelming evidence of a conspiracy, then the White House is in the interesting position of being the first to designate Oswald as the assassin and the first to have ruled out in the face of impressive evidence to the contrary, that there could have been a conspiracy." (letter from Salandria to Mr. Pierre Salinger, December 3, 1967.)

Salandria concluded a plea to Salinger for the tape with:

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1. Salinger, Pierre, With Kennedy, pp. 22-25. New York: Avon Books, 1967.

"Will you render this service to civilian rule and democracy for which President Kennedy gave his life?"

Pierre Salinger was quite willing to render such a service:

"Since the tape with which I worked was provided by the White House Communication Agency, it would seem to me that the tape of the conversation to which you refer would emanate from the same source, if such a tape, in fact, exists.

"As to the conversation with the cabinet plane, the transcript of that conversation is in my personal files which have been turned over to the National Archives for placement in the Kennedy Library.

"I certainly have no objection to your seeing that transcript, although the National Archives will undoubtedly write and ask my permission since it is included in my personal papers." (letter of December 26, 1967 from Mr. Pierre Salinger to Vincent J. Salandria)

But apparently what the White House Communication Agency giveth, the said branch of the Pentagon may taketh away. Dr. Bahmer answered Salandria's next request for the tape in a letter dated January 9, 1968:

"After receipt of your letter of December 28, a careful examination was made of the papers that Mr. Salinger has sent to us for storage. We have not, however, been able to find anything in the nature of a transcript of the tape recording that you are searching for.

"I regret that our reply to your inquiries, therefore, must still be in the negative. There is nothing that we are able to add to my earlier letter to you on this subject."

In his letter of January 2, 1968, to Salandria, Colonel U.S. Air Force, Armed Forces Aide to the President, James U. Cross was succinct in his refusal to cooperate in the search for the tape:

"I have been asked to respond to your letter, addressed to the White House Communication Agency, concerning a tape recording to Air Force One, November 22, 1963.

"Logs and tapes of the radio transmissions of military aircraft, including those of Air Force One, are kept for official use only. These tapes are not releasable, nor are they obtainable from commercial sources."

"I am sorry my response cannot be more favorable."

And so was Salandria. But Colonel Cross should know that Mr. T. H. White had access to the tape and his was not an "official use." Mr. Salinger had access to the transcript of the tape, and the use to which he put it was not "official."

Salandria was tempted to inquire of Colonel Cross whether he happened to know who removed Mr. Salinger's tape from his "personal files" while they were in the custody of the "National Archives for placement in the Kennedy Library." Salandria was tempted to ask how a transcript which was turned over to a journalist could attain, on an ex post facto basis, classified status and thereafter be restricted to official use only. But Salandria lost interest in pressing any further for the tape, because he strongly suspected that further pressure on the Pentagon would give birth to another governmental forgery in a case which is already over-burdened with governmental fabrication. Any tape produced at this late date after the shenanigans outlined above will perforce be as forged as the X-Rays and photographs of the Kennedy autopsy will be if and when they are ever produced.

The search for the tape did come full circle however with the following charming letter:

"In order to reply to your letter of last December 26, we sent a number of inquiries to various government agencies which has resulted in this very tardy reply

"To begin with, a search of our collections in the Library of Congress has not revealed any such recording.. Normally we would expect such recordings to go to the National Archives, and since it relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, to the Office of Presidential Libraries in that agency, where material for the Kennedy Library is being assembled. As I understand you have already learned from your earlier inquiry to the National Archives, no such recording has been located there. Our further inquiries with the Department of Defense have also failed to turn up any evidence of the recording, but we were advised to request that you write to the Department of the Army, Chief of Communications and Electronics, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. Perhaps that office can be of some assistance "(Letter from The Library of Congress, Donald L. Leavitt, Head, Recorded Sound Section to Vincent J. Salandria, dated February 20, 1968.)

"Perhaps that office can be of some assistance." Mr. Leavitt, we doubt it.

In summary, the report of this tape provided by Mr. Theodore H. White indicates that the Federal governmental apparatus had jumped the gun right after the guns of Dallas had completed their deadly work in dispatching a President from this world. The Pentagon had overly reacted to Oswald as the assassin and prematurely began the federal government's unvarying pattern of refusing to react to evidence of conspiracy.

If the problem of a tape informing us of a conspiracy at too early a moment in the history of the investigation were an isolated incident, we should be less confident in our suspicions, but it is no more than one element of a syndrome of behavior inappropriate to the challenges raised by the President's murder.

As we have said, it is always the case that officials are acting in the designation of Oswald as the assassin where the evidence does not warrant such a conclusion, and are failing to act by not investigating the evolving evidence pointing towards conspiracy. In the case of the tape there was an over action in the governmental officials' determination of no conspiracy. Such a finding was made by the federal government without any basis. Compare that with the inaction in the failure of the police officials to cut off transportation out of Dallas on the ominous day of the 22nd of November, 1963.

Mark Lane in his early lecture tour provided us with a most revealing story. A French journalist, desiring to provide an existential account of the efficiency of the FBI, decided to go to the airport at Dallas on the day of the assassination and attempt to fly back to France. He knew he would be questioned concerning why he was buying a ticket on the day of the assassination, and why he was trying to get out of the country. He was ready to sacrifice himself in order to get a first-hand account of how the

FBI would swing into action and deal with a man trying to get out of the country. It would probably be tough on him, but would make a good story. He got a good story all right. He bought his ticket; boarded the plane, and flew back to Paris with no interference. Transportation was not sealed off. The President of the United States had been murdered; the world leader had been shot down in the streets, and Oswald had not yet been established as a lone assassin, and transportation routes weren't blocked off!

Early Evidence of Conspiracy Abounds:

Now there has been much argument concerning the facts of the assassination. What is more significant than entering such argument at this late date is observation that at the time of the assassination and shortly thereafter what officials knew or had excellent reason to know was not what they acted on. Thus, in keeping with the pattern we have sought to establish as existing in official behavior, it can be shown there should have been specific action where conspiracy was indicated. Instead, there was inaction. Considerable early evidence which accumulated pointed to conspiracy. It is irrelevant whether subsequent discovery resolved errors in the original understanding of what transpired on that black Friday. All that is relevant is that there was more than sufficient evidence of conspiracy to require of an innocent federal government definite reaction. This is true with respect to eyewitness testimony, physical and medical evidence, and the facts surrounding the character and background of Oswald.

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Mark Lane demonstrated in Rush to Judgment that nearly 60 persons believed the shots that were fired at President Kennedy came from the grassy knoll. By now material concerning eyewitness accounts inconsistent with the assumption of a lone assassin lodged in the Texas School Book Depository, is well known. There is no need to labor this evidence here.

What is relevant here is to assess such testimony in the light of this pattern of action/inaction which seems to prevail in all official behavior.

Let us assume, for example, that the eyewitness testimony fails to stand up to critical analysis of the evidence as it is subsequently analysed (which we believe is in fact contrary to the case), but assume it anyhow. Further, let us assume any eyewitness testimony to be of limited value in determining what has happened in any given problematic situation. Considering all that, nonetheless, at the time this testimony would have had to suffice as a guide to official action until something better came along.

Let us now undertake to examine this early evidence which pointed towards a conspiracy. Immediately after the shooting, Sheriff Bill Decker ordered:

"Get over to the area where the shooting occurred and saturate the area of the park, railroad; and all buildings."
(XIX H 458)

Jesse E. Curry, Chief of Police, driving the lead car issued the order:

"Get a man on top of that triple underpass to see what happened up there."
(XVII H 467)

The weight of authority and eyewitness reaction establishes the shots as coming not from the School Book Depository, but the grassy knoll. Needless to say, shots from both places were not mutually exclusive concepts except by the logic of the Warren Commission. Now, disputation over the subsequent reactions could later be demonstrated to be erroneous. Again, the nagging question arises as to why at that time, in the light of such evidence, authorities did not overturn the whole area to discover if any person or persons might have consummated the crime from sites in addition to or other than the Depository.

Building. In a crime of such gravity, where there is official innocence, no stones would be left unturned. In fact, what was unturned in the form of stones which marked a conspiracy were so numerous that they resembled glacial deposits. Let us continue to pick our way through those deposits of first-day conspiratorial stones which juttied up all over Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, for the truth is concealed under them.

Numerous law enforcement officers and spectators immediately after the shots were fired ran toward the railroad yards in pursuit of suspected assassins. (VI H 288, II H 181) The films of Dealey Plaza immediately after the shots had been fired dramatically illustrate the rush of persons to the grassy knoll area. Within minutes of the assassination an estimated 50 policemen were searching the parking lot and railroad yards. (VI H. 288, II H 181)

Policeman Billy Hargis left the motorcade and raced up the grassy knoll to the apparent source of the shots. (V H 295) Sam Holland, a spectator, fearlessly raced into the parking lot which sits atop the grassy knoll from the railroad overpass. (VI H 243-246) Seymour Weitzman not only raced to the area of the knoll, but later located a piece of the President's skull on the South side of Elm Street and then found a rifle on the 6th floor of the Depository Building. (VII H 107)

One report was that a man and woman had been seen scrambling away across the grassy knoll. (Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 22, p. 1) A man with a "headpiece" in his hand had been seen running away from another spot in the knoll area. (XIX H, 492, XXIV H 222) The first people to reach the parking lot, where most of the spectators thought the shots originated from, found numerous footprints in the mud behind a picket fence. (VI H 245-246, XXII H 833) Two men with rifles had also been seen on the 6th floor of the Texas School Book Depository Bldg. (XXIV H 522) Ten minutes after the assassination a suspect raced from the Depository, signaled a car, jumped

into the car on the run, and was driven away. (VI H 266-267)

The Wounds Cry Out Conspiracy

Of course the wounds inflicted on persons in Dealey Plaza did not inspire confidence in a lone-assassin killing. The President had been hit in the back at a point which caused Secret Service Agent Glen A. Bennett, who was stationed in the Presidential follow-up car to say that he saw a shot "hit the President about four inches down from the right shoulder."¹ The President was further wounded in the anterior neck. Much of his head was shattered and great avulsive wounds had resulted when pieces of skull were driven out of his skull. Governor Connally suffered a wound in the back, right chest, right wrist and left femur. A bystander, a third man, James T. Tague, was wounded in Dealey Plaza. (W-116) Such carnage, added to damage to the Presidential limousine apparently resulting from the shooting, underscores the ominous and precipitous nature of the Pentagon's conclusion the very afternoon of the assassination that there was no conspiracy.

Let us for the moment consider the tiny neck wound in the front of the President and what should have been the natural action of an innocent government to that wound. The Commission made reference to the televised statement of Dr. Malcolm O. Perry with reference to the throat wound:

"Immediately after the assassination, many people reached erroneous conclusions about the source of the shots because of Dr. Perry's observations to the press...Dr. Perry stated merely that it was 'possible' that the neck wound was a wound of entrance." (W-90,91)

New York Times

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1. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, p. 111, United States Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1964. References to this Report are hereafter designated by "W" followed by a page number.

The New York Times of November 23, 1963 stated:

"...Dr. Malcolm Perry...gave...details...
Mr. Kennedy was hit by a bullet in the throat...
This wound had the appearance of a bullet's entry."

Let us give the Commission the benefit of all doubts and assume that it was right and The New York Times was wrong and misquoted Dr. Perry. Suppose, therefore, that Dr. Perry merely said, as the Commission contended he had, that it was "possible that the neck wound was a wound of entrance." Remember, that at the time Dr. Perry said that, the federal government had no evidence with which to contravene Dr. Perry's assessment of the neck wound as "possibly" one of entry. The dead President's body was in a cask heading for or on the Presidential plane in preparation for being flown back to Washington for the pomp of an unprecedented military funeral. We know now, and the federal government had every reason to know then, that the Presidential limousine was photographed proceeding away from the Texas Book Depository Building when it was first fired upon.

On the basis of Dr. Perry's statement of a "possible" entry wound in the front of the President, and because at the time of the inception of the firing, and at all times during the firing, the President had not faced the officially-designated assassin who was in the rear of the President, an innocent government would be under obligation to act on this information. Certainly we should have anticipated that the Mexican border would have been shut off by the U.S. authorities. Transportation terminals would have been saturated with police officials in an effort to cut off the escape of the assassin or assassins who "possibly" were positioned in the front of the President. We must bear in mind that the government did not have at this time the august and now largely discredited Warren Commission Report to hide

behind. The job of the federal authorities flush up against the assassination proper was to explore every "possibility" of apprehending any "possible" assassins. We are compelled to conclude that it was a guilty government that saw fit to rely upon the Warren Commission conclusions of a single assassin positioned in the rear of the President at a point where it had every reason to suspect that at least one assassin had fired from the front of the President.

Conspiracy was Implicit in the Press Accounts of November 22, 1963

While the Pentagon was informing the President that there was no conspiracy, based on the above-described wounds, the American press was outlining a conspiracy which was very different from the Pentagon version of the assassination.

Dallas (UPI), November 22, 1963, page 1 of The Billings Gazette, of Billings, Montana carried this report:

"Some of the Secret Service agents thought the gunfire was from an automatic weapon first... probably from the grassy knoll to which motorcycle policemen directed their attention as they raced up the slope."

The Lowell Sun, Lowell Massachusetts, November 22, 1963 carried on its first page the UPI account that:

"It was impossible to tell at once where Kennedy was hit, but bullet wounds in Connally's chest were plainly visible, indicating the gunfire might possibly have come from an automatic weapon."

The front page of the Illinois State Register of the same date carried the UPI report:

"Newsmen some five car lengths behind the President heard what sounded like three bursts of gunfire."

The Berkshire Eagle, of Pittsfield, Massachusetts on the assassination day carried a front-page refutation of a cut-and-dry-one-assassin theory which refutation should have given pause to the Pentagon's immediate conclusion that one assassin had performed the bloody work at Dealey Plaza:

"Three gunbursts of fire, apparently from automatic weapons, were heard."

Perhaps no automatic weapon or weapons were used. Perhaps there was no firing from the grassy knoll. Perhaps the Connally wounds did not prove conspiracy. Perhaps the later drying cleaning and pressing of the Connally clothing prior to submission to the F.B.I. was just ^afunction of idiotic innocence on the part of the government. Perhaps there were just three shots and not bursts of gun fire. But, the press accounts of the wounds, their complexity and number, and the initial accounts of automatic weapons firing from other than the Texas Book Depository provide a grim background for the Pentagon's reassurances to the President and the cabinet that one man positioned behind the President.

Back in Dealey Plaza the Evidence Spells out Conspiracy

Not only did the shots seem to emanate from the grassy knoll area by virtue of the auditory clues, but puffs of smoke were reported as seen in the area of the knoll at the time of the firing.¹ In addition to puffs of smoke being seen in the grassy knoll locale, gunpowder was smelled in the same area. Such evidence,

at least, at the time, should have aroused suspicions of a conspiracy, and should have caused the most intensive manhunt, rather than satisfaction with a single assassin concept.

Surely, eye or ear-witness testimony can never constitute the most solid foundation for reconstruction of an event. And although the majority of witnesses did not testify as to hearing more than three shots, still this was the murder of the President, and eyewitness testimony should have roused questions about the direction and number of shots. The result of those unanswered questions should have been to have set in action a search for a person or persons other than Oswald who may have been involved alone or in conjunction with him. Instead of action directed at discovering what happened, there was federal action directed at entertaining only the evidence consistent with a long-assassin theory.

In addition to testimony concerning direction and number of shots, that evidence concerning "bunching" of shots should have sufficed to shock officials into action. An amateur photographer, Abraham Zapruder, took a film of the assassination, and based upon it, the time of the assassination has been established as taking place between 4.8 seconds and 5.6 seconds. The Zapruder motion picture camera operates at an average speed of 18.2 frames per second. The very shortest time one can work that bolt-action rifle alleged to have been used by Oswald is 2.3 seconds. That 2.3 seconds is equivalent to about 42 frames of the Zapruder film. If there were only one assassin, it therefore mathematically follows, between each shot there must have been a minimum of 42

of 42 frames. If one shot were fired and then another in a shorter interval than 42 frames, that would add up to two assassins. For there to have been but one assassin there would have had to been an even spacing of the shots with a minimum of 42 frames between each shot. As a matter of fact, the Warren Report informs us, a majority of the witnesses stated the shots were not evenly fired, but that the second and third shots were "bunched" together. Indeed, even Secret Service agent Roy H. Kellerman testified that shots were "bunched." He was in the President's car and stated "...a flurry of shells came into the car..." Kellerman described these shots as so bunched as to be like "a plane breaking the sound barrier, bang, bang." (II H 74 & 76) With the unfortunately slow weapon of Oswald's in their possession, and testimony concerning "bunching," immediate action should have ensued aimed at finding two or more assassins and other weapons. What the government was really saying was that, irrespective of what its honest agents such as Roy H. Kellerman concluded, there was to be one assassin and he was to be Oswald.

No Governmental Response to the Unwanted Conspiracy Evidence

Still, evidence of more than one assassin having been involved in the assassination continued to pour into the Dallas police authorities. Whether two assassins or many, it seemed clear that the escape had been well planned. Local police agencies and the F.B.I. normally respond to bank robberies and other crimes by setting up road blocks and by mobilizing dragnets. But, in this case, which involved the assassination of a President and the wounding

of a governor, no action of any sort was taken to seal off any part of Dallas or the entire city itself. Bus terminals, airports and trains were not watched. Private planes were not grounded. Roadblocks were not set up. The city was not swarming with local and federal investigators. Not only was the attack on the President not treated as an act directed against the government of the U.S., it was not even treated as important a crime as the robbing of a bank. Such neglect on the part of the federal police agencies constituted nothing short of malfeasance. The question arises- how can one assassin induce those in command of federal police agencies to commit malfeasance of such incredible proportions? An argument might be made for the innocence of the Dallas police on the bases of paralysis and gross incompetence, shock, confusion and the fact that they were besieged by both press and public, but the failure of federal agencies remains suspect of being criminal in nature.

The widespread confusion and panic following the Lincoln assassination did not prevent the mobilization of the full resources of the federal government to seal off the city of Washington and to begin a massive investigation. But the almost complete failure of federal intelligence agencies following the Kennedy assassination occurred in a circumstance lacking in widespread hysteria. Their malfeasance was represented in their failure to follow up on any and all leads thrusting in the direction of conspiracy. There is no evidence to support the proposition that federal government agents had been thrown into a panic which might possibly have provided a weak rationale for their initial inaction. There is, on the contrary, substantial evidence of government response, but never to evidence of conspiracy.

An unidentified CIA agent showed up at the Parkland Hospital shortly after the assassination. (XVIII H 795) F.B.I. agents who interviewed Lee Harvey Oswald after his arrest were apparently calm enough to carefully avoid asking any key questions or dropping any hints to the accused that he was a suspect in the Kennedy assassination.

The failure of police agencies to seal off the city of Dallas was soon confounded by another seemingly inexplicable failure. Once the assassins had escaped from the scene, it would seem reasonable, in the absence of clues to their identity, that they would be searched for among J.F.K.'s self-proclaimed enemies in Dallas. If federal agencies were unsure of where to begin, they could have asked the man on the street. Less than a month before the assassination, Adlai Stevenson had been physically attacked and spat on by an angry Dallas mob. The morning of the assassination there was a black-bordered full page ad in the Dallas Morning News which attacked the President. (W-294) Handbills entitled "Wanted for Treason" bearing the President's profile were handed out on the streets one or two days before President Kennedy's arrival. (W-298) The author of this handbill was Robert A. Surrey, who is and was then closely associated with General Edwin Walker. (W-298) General Walker was flying the flag outside his house at half-staff and upside down- an international symbol of distress. Walker flew it properly after Kennedy's death had been announced. (UPI Dispatch, Dallas, Dec. 10, 1963)

Government Reaction to Oswald as Assassin- Reflexively Quick

Juxtaposed to the failure to provide any explanation for the extreme reluctance of the authorities to follow conspiratorial leads, there is also no satisfactory explanation of why there was such fast action in wanting Oswald. There was no general roll call in the Depository, and other employees than Oswald left the building. Thus, his behavior as a Depository employee did not seem to distinguish him in any way. The alleged eyewitness to the President's assassination, Howard L. Brennan, who was supposed to have seen Oswald do the shooting, is hardly a reliable witness. He failed to pick out Oswald in the police line up that day:

(III H 148) Further, if we assume Brennan to have been a creditable observe, the question remains concerning why after he informed the police, the assassin was in the Book Depository, police continued to concentrate on the knoll area, and why there was not immediate action to seal off the Depository.

Further, if there was such prompt action in responding to Brennan's description of Oswald as being on the sixth floor of the School Book Depository, the question arises concerning why there was such inaction until 1:22 P.M. that the rifle and shells were not found on the sixth floor until that time.

Similar problems with eyewitness testimony related to the killing of Officer Tippit fail to inspire confidence in official honesty. Helen L. Markam, an eyewitness to the Tippit murder, gave a description of the assassin which didn't fit Oswald. In addition to Mrs. Markam, the only other witnesses who actually

saw the shooting of Tippit were Domingo Benavides and Acquilla Clemons, and neither of them identified Oswald.

After his arrest, Oswald was taken to police headquarters for interrogation. When Chief of Homicide, Fritz, arrived at HQ's shortly after 2:00 P.M. and put out a pick-up order on Oswald, he was told that Oswald was already in custody. (W-9) The reason for the pick-up order was ostensibly that Oswald had been noticed as "missing" from the Depository after the assassination by Roy Truly, manager of the building. (W-9) Although Oswald was not the only man missing from the Depository, Chief of Homicide, Fritz, immediately felt "it was important to hold him." (IV h 206) Again for some unknown reason, Oswald seemed to be in the spotlight. Oswald was interrogated extensively for the remainder of the day by the Dallas police, Secret Service agents, and F.B.I. agents. No transcripts exist for these or any other sessions during which Oswald was questioned. According to the testimony and notes made by those who questioned Oswald, he was never once asked about either the Tippit murder or Kennedy assassination. At a midnight press conference on Friday night Oswald made the following remarks:

"I really don't know what the situation is about. Nobody had told me anything except that I am accused of, of murdering a policeman. I know nothing more than that and I do request someone to come forward to give me legal assistance." (W-200-201)

When asked if he had killed the President, Oswald replied:

"No, I have not been charged with that. In fact nobody has said that to me yet. The first thing I heard about it was when the newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that question." (W-201)

He told John Hart of CBS: "I'm just a Patsy."¹ This is incredible! Oswald was interrogated for about eight hours and apparently never asked about whether he killed the President.

Oswald was not the only suspect arrested that day. Richard Sprague, an independent investigator, has found photographic evidence of eight or nine persons under arrest following the assassination. Three were tramps arrested near the railroad tracks; two were Negroes, one was a Cuban, and one was arrested in Fort Worth. Only one, Larry Florer, has been identified, and he was not questioned by the Warren Commission. (R. Sprague, "The Kennedy Assassination," Oct. 15, 1967. Edition #4)

But there were others. Minutes after the shots an unarmed 31 year old man was arrested in the railroad yards adjacent to the parking lot. He was arrested and booked on charges of "investigation of conspiracy to commit murder." These charges weren't dropped until Dec. 2, eight days after Lee Harvey Oswald's murder. He was held for eight days during which the Dallas police and nationwide news media were claiming the case was closed and Oswald was the sole assassin. He was still being held on Dec. 8 on "city charges" and there is no way of knowing when, if ever, he was released (Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 8, 1963)

Just after the shots, patrolman W. E. Barber noticed workers on the 3rd floor of the Depository tapping on a window and pointing to a man wearing horn-rimmed glasses, a plaid jacket, and a raincoat. He was immediately arrested and taken to Sheriff Bill Decker's office for questioning. (Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 22, 1963)

At about 1:15 patrolman L. S. Debenport told the police radio dis-

¹ Jones, Penn, Forgive My Grief II, p. 11. The Midlothean Mirror, Inc., Texas, 1967.

patcher that he was "taking a prisoner to the downtown jail." (XXIII H 919) A short time later police brought a "disheveled- looking man" from the Depository. Jack Beers Jr., a photographer for the Dallas Morning News, snapped a picture of him. (XIII H 105) Chief Deputy Sheriff Allen Sweatt reported an arrest made about this time which may be a reference to the same incident. According to him, a police officer "brought a boy with a sport coat up and said, 'Here is the man that had done the shooting.'" Since the Warren Commission never made any inquiries about this arrest, there is no way of knowing why the police officer thought that he had apprehended the assassin. (XIX H 532)

Finally, when Oswald's mother and wife went to visit him in the Dallas Sheriff's Office, they were told that there would be a long delay because the police had "picked up another suspect." Whoever this man was, the police were quite interested in him. (I H 149) Perhaps the most interesting thing about these suspects is that most or possibly all of them were arrested at the scene of the crime. Oswald, of course, was not.

Physical evidence and eyewitness testimony were also pouring in. Three empty cartridge cases were found near the S. E. corner window on the sixth floor of the Depository Bldg., and a bolt action rifle with a telescopic sight was discovered in a different section of the same floor. Ownership of the rifle was not traced until about 2:00 A.M. the next morning. (W-79)

Eyewitness testimony indicated the following:

1. Shots had been fired from behind a picket fence which is on top of the grassy knoll to the west of the Dook Depository Bldg. In

addition to ear-witness testimony, several witnesses saw a puff of smoke in that area, and a police officer smelled gunsmoke. (VI H 243-245; XXIII H 833-836) Many footprints were found on the ground and strangers had been seen in the area prior to the assassination. (VI H 245-246; XXII H 833; VI H 287) Finally, a man with credentials, identifying him as a Secret Service man, was encountered by a policeman as he was escaping from the area just after the shots. (VII H 535)

2. Shots had been fired from the S.E. corner window from the 6th floor of the Book Depository Bldg. Three men had been seen on the floor prior to the shots, two of whom were armed with rifles. (II H 171, 175-176) Eyewitness testimony seemed to indicate that only one man had done any shooting.

3. A man was seen escaping from the area between the Depository and the picket fence who was thought to have a "headpiece" in his hands. (XIX H 492; XXIV H 222) Four unusual vehicles cruised in the area restricted to police cars behind the picket fence prior to the shooting, and at least one was driven by a man speaking into a microphone. (XXV H 853; VI H 285-286)

DP: Conf of
J/A/M?

4. A man was seen carrying a "guncase" up towards the picket fence more than an hour prior to the assassination while another man stayed in their truck which seemed to be stalled. (XIX H 983-84; XXIV H 216)

In conclusion, even if all of the preceding testimony was later judged to be incorrect in a court of law, on the day of the assassination it suggested in an overwhelming fashion a conspiracy to kill

✓ Kennedy. According to Henry Wade, the D. A. of Dallas, "...preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved in the shooting... the electric chair is too good for the killers." (Dallas Morning News, Nov. 23, 1963) There was reason to believe of course, that others might be involved as accessories before and after the fact. It should be added that, if Oswald was involved, there was immediate evidence of at least one accessory after the fact. The only convincing eyewitness identification of Oswald made that day was by a Deputy Sheriff, Roger D. Craig, who saw him leave the Depository ten minutes after the shooting and then identified him at police HQ's. (VI H 266 & 26) He stated that he saw Oswald run from the Depository and jump into a car driven by another man which sped away from the scene. Oswald, according to Craig, immediately admitted that he had full knowledge of the incident. (VI H 270; XIX H 524)

On that afternoon, the strongest evidence against Oswald was that he was inside the Depository when the shots were fired. Since he worked in the Depository, and there were also others in the building at the time of the assassination, this is poor evidence indeed. When asked where he was at the time of the shots, he replied that he was on the first floor eating his lunch. Since patrolman Marion Baker and Depository manager Roy Truly rushed up into the Depository immediately following the shots and found Oswald in the second floor lunchroom, there would appear to be no reason to question Oswald's claim. Baker testified he was calm and was not out of breath. (W-149, 152) Depository employees who were near the stairs or who ran down them were questioned, but none had seen or heard Oswald descending the stairs. (W-71; VI H 388; XXII H 632, 676)

Since the shots fired from the Depository appeared to have come from the sixth floor, Oswald seemed to have had an alibi.

By late in the afternoon of Nov. 22, 1963, the following was the state of affairs:

① John F. Kennedy was dead and his body had been illegally taken from Dallas ostensibly because of the concern for the protection of Jacqueline Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. But what possible excuse could be provided for the removal of his Presidential car which was damaged in the firing on the motorcade and constituted vital evidence in the anticipated trial of Oswald? Until proven otherwise, the Secret Service was duty-bound to assume that there was a conspiracy to kill Kennedy and other high officials.

② The available evidence overwhelmingly indicated that there had been a conspiracy to kill at least the President. There had apparently been enough gunmen strategically placed in Deally Plaza to have also killed Lyndon Johnson. There was no way of telling at the time whether the plans had been to kill Johnson also, which plans may have been frustrated by the fast action of Secret Service men who pushed him down in the seat and covered his body with theirs.

③ A number of suspects had been arrested. Of these suspects, we know only of Oswald, against whom at the time of the assassination there was no evidence for participation in the crime and who was not charged with the crime until 1:30 the next morning.

What is most disturbing about the investigation of the assassination is that it is seemed to proceed with the lone assassin thesis at the outset. If such is the case, then one is face with prim facie evi-

★ → dence of foreknowledge of the assassin's action on the part of those who guide our federal intelligence agencies. Again we must also raise questions about the conduct of the Dallas police, but their failure is nowhere near as disturbing as that of federal agencies.

Let us now examine some of the unusual facets of the investigation of the assassination of J. F. K.

Failure to Investigate Oswald's Associates

We have already pointed out that despite the arrest of a number of suspects at the scene of the crime, the investigation following the assassination focussed on Oswald. But forgetting for the moment the failure to interrogate the enemies of J.F.K. in Dallas and failure to seal off the city, there is another glaringly apparent failure. Given their assumption that Oswald was the assassin, it seems inexplicable that police agencies did not investigate persons who might have conspired with Oswald.

For instance, as has already been pointed out, Oswald was seen driving away from the Depository by another man. He is reported to have admitted the incident and then apparently went on to affirm that the car used belonged to Mrs. Ruth Paine. (XIX H 521) (It is worthy of note that the car has an identical description to one owned by Mrs. Paine.) But when the police arrived at the Paine house at almost 3:00 P.M., all they wanted to do was to search Oswald's things. (W-15) They did not seem alarmed when Mrs. Paine greeted them at the door saying that she was expecting them. Interestingly enough, Marina Oswald testified that Ruth Paine had told her shots had been fired at the President from the building where Lee worked. (I H 74; XXIV H 640) But Mrs. Paine testified before the

Commission that she thought Lee Oswald worked in the Book Depository Warehouse two blocks from the assassination scene. (III H 34-36) If Marina's testimony is accurate, Ruth Paine has some explaining to do. Ironically, Mary Suratt, who owned the tavern where John Wilkes Booth plotted Lincoln's assassination, became a suspect as an accomplice after having made a similar statement and run some errands for Booth. (Eisenhower, Otto, Lincoln's Assassination, Illinois State Historical Journal; Vol. 43, Autumn 1950, pp. 204-220)

But Ruth Paine ran more than errands for Oswald. Oswald's wife stayed in the Paine house in Irving, Texas, and he went there on weekends. His rifle was allegedly stored in their garage. (W-15)

Ruth Paine drove Marina Oswald the 500 miles to New Orleans in May, 1963, and then transported Marina and all the Oswald's belongings back to Irving, Texas in September of the same year. (W-14) If we seem suspicious of Paine's generosity, it is because after the assassination, she failed to get Lee Harvey Oswald legal assistance which he had requested of her. Mrs. Paine not only failed to get a lawyer, but compounded this failure by neglecting to advise Oswald of her failure to obtain a lawyer, thus placing him in great peril and leaving him ignorant of this peril. (3 H 89)

Most interesting of all is the fact that Ruth Paine got Oswald his job at the Depository Building. It seems an incredible coincidence that she placed only one phone call to get Oswald a job, and that phone call was to the Book Depository. (W-14) Further, Mrs. Paine spoke Russian and had corresponded with persons living in the Soviet Union for a number of years. (W-285) This correspondence did not interfere with her husband's security clearance which is further discussed. It is astonishing that Ruth Paine was never treated with suspicion by either the Dallas police or the federal intelligence agencies.

Michael Paine, Mrs. Paine's husband, was not treated with sus-

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dition either, despite the fact that he had attended political meetings with Oswald (II H 408) Michael's father was one of the leading Trotsyists in the U.S., and Michael attended some of their meetings while in high school. (II H 289-290; XXIII H 501) Nevertheless, despite his family background, he managed to get security clearance for his work as a research engineer for Bell Helicopter Co. (W-286) One is left to wonder what his quid pro quo for his clearance was.

It might be noticed at this point that once the Dallas police and federal agents had decided Oswald was a leftist, it would have seemed reasonable to round up other leftists for questioning. But no such action was taken. Considering the political atmosphere in Dallas, this is more surprising than the failure to pick up right wingers following the assassination.

Other suspicious associates of the Oswald's were George De Mohrenschildt and his wife Jean. George De Mohrenschildt has been described as a "strong believer in the U.S. form of government but he holds the belief that some form of undemocratic government might be best for other peoples." (W-283) George's son-in-law, Gary C. Taylor, said that if Oswald had gotten any assistance in the assassination, he would guess it was from the De Mohrenschildts. The following represents an excerpt from the testimony of Gary C. Taylor: "Well, the only thing that occurred to me that- uh- and I guess it was from the beginning- that if there was any assistance or plotters in the assassination, that it was in my opinion, most probably the De Mohrenschildts." (IX H 100) The DeMohrenschildts saw the Oswalds frequently prior to the assassination and according to the Warren Report, "De Mohrenschildt was apparently the only

Russian speaking person living in Dallas for whom Oswald had appreciable respect, and this seems to have been true even though De Mohrenschildt helped Marina Oswald leave her husband..." (W-282) Even after the Oswald's broke off all relations with the Russian speaking community in Dallas, they continued to see the De Mohrenschildts. (W-401) De Mohrenschildt has traveled extensively, and in 1960 he and his wife made an eight month hike from the U.S. Mexico border to Panama. (W-283) According to the Warren Report: "By happenstance they were in Guatemala city at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion." (W-283) According to De Mohrenschildt, he prepared a lengthy film and complete written log of the trip, and made a report on it to the U.S. government. (IX H 216) Despite a seemingly thorough investigation of De Mohrenschildt who had aroused their suspicions, there is no record of the Warren Commission ever having examined any documents relating to the trip. After the Bay of Pigs the De Mohrenschildts went to Haiti and became involve in what the Warren Report refers to as a "government-oriented business venture." (W-283) While the Warren Commission assures us that the De Mohrenschildts were not disloyal or subversive (W-283-284); one must wonder whether they could have truthfully assured us that they were not in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency. In any event, one wonders why they were immune from investigation in the days following Oswald's capture.

Within a week of the assassination the F.B.I. was notified of some incredible evidence concerning conspiracy. A young Cuban woman, Sylvia Odio, who was active in the anti-Castro movement, claimed to have been visited by a Leon Oswald and two other men in September of 1963. Both she and her sister independently indenti-

fied Lee Harvey Oswald as being Leon Oswald upon seeing his picture on T.V. Mrs. Odio testified that she received a call from one of the men with Oswald the next day and that he told her that Leon Oswald was a former Marine and expert marksman, that he was "loco" and capable of anything, and that he felt that Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs. (XI H 369, 377-379) Despite its obvious importance the F.B.I. conducted a very slow and superficial investigation into the incident which was not even concluded when the Warren Report went to press. (W-374) This entire incident is still wide open for explanation leaving in its wake serious questions. The two most obvious questions are whether Oswald conspired with others to kill Kennedy and whether an attempt to frame Oswald for the crime had begun as early as Sept. 1963. Neither precludes the involvement of the federal government, and the entire incident points out the widespread suppression of evidence by federal agencies which took place following the assassination.

Physical and Medical Evidence

With respect to physical evidence providing a basis for a call to action in response to conspiracy in the killing of Kennedy is even more overwhelming and more conclusive than in the case of eyewitness testimony. Officials need only have viewed the Zapruder film to have seen the fatal shot to Kennedy came from in front of him, and not from behind, as is alleged by the Warren Commission. Nothing is more dramatic than the impact the scene has on one who

had been fed the party-line position that Kennedy was shot from the Depository only. Kennedy is hit in the head and is propelled to the left and rear. We have seen the copy of the film in the Archives several times and it always is amazing. Every researcher who sees it has the same reaction. The laws of physics leave no doubt on this point. If Kennedy was forced backwards, as he was; he was shot from the front; other things being equal as they were. James Altgens, A.P. photographer was on the south side of Elm Street or to the left of President Kennedy, and he said that particles of flesh flew in his direction, and that would imply the shot was from the right front of Kennedy. Another witness, Charles F. Brehan, saw skull flying to the left and rear. Also police officers, Martin and Hargis, driving motorcycles to the left and rear of the presidential limousine were splattered with blood and brain matter. Such debris from Kennedy had to have followed the course it did as a result of a shot from the front. Such physical evidence clearly implied an assassin or assassins other than Oswald, or in addition to him. Why no action to apprehend the assassins? Why has our country failed to act on the most basic evidence of a conspiracy? The Warren Report never addressed a single word to this problem.

Let us turn our attention again to the throat wound of President Kennedy. All of the doctors at Parkland Memorial Hospital diagnosed the wound in President Kennedy's neck as an entrance wound. It was known very soon after the assassination that the presidential limousine had passed the Book Depository and Oswald had to have been shooting from the rear he couldn't have hit President Kennedy in the front of the neck. Now if Kennedy had been hit in the front of the neck, Oswald, if involved as an assassin or not, could certainly not

have been the lone assassin. Whatever subsequent discovery might have been made to have justified the assumption of the "neck" wound of President Kennedy was in fact an exit wound, there was a point at which the neck wound was believed by federal police to have been an entrance wound. Why no action at that time to apprehend the assassins who may have shot the President in the front of the neck? Weeks later there were experiments by federal police designed to discover how the President could have been hit in the front from the back. It would have been more logical to have wondered who hit the President in the front from the front, and to have undertaken to look for such a person.

The F.B.I. report found the bullet that the Commission maintained entered Kennedy, exited through his neck and wounded Governor Connally actually never exited from Kennedy. We know the time of the assassination shots was such that if more than three bullets had been fired, there had to have been a minimum of two assassins firing. Assume the F.B.I. was mistaken in its conclusion about that bullet not exiting from Kennedy, the incriminating question concerns: why they failed to act on that mistake. To conclude there was a second assassin, all the F.B.I. had to know was how to count beyond three. For assuming competency in elementary arithmetic the F.B.I. was aware of a bullet in Kennedy that did not exit, at least one bullet in Connally, the fatal head wound bullet, the neck wound, and bullet, and another bullet or bullet fragment which struck first a curb and then nicked a bystander, James T. Tague. Ignoring evidence of damage to the Presidential limousine and other eyewitness evidence of misses, we have a minimum of five bullets. Five bullets means at least two assassins. It doesn't matter that the figures the F.B.I. were working with might have been wrong, the point is they were the figures. Those figures would have required the F.B.I. to be seeking a second assassin. What the F.B.I. was finally instructed were the facts of the case is irrelevant. If we are to suppose the F.B.I. didn't know the "real" autopsy, then we must

HIDING from
"CONSPIRACY"
(like an elephant hiding
from a mouse)

also suppose that on the basis of what it understood to be the facts, the F.B.I. should have put two and three together and come up with two or more assassins.

Why, indeed, was there a natural immobilization on the question of two assassins? Why above all else did the idea of a conspiracy become unthinkable in the Cold War American where for the past twenty years a virtual paranoia concerning communist plotting, machinations, and conspiracy has prevailed? Why in this nation, which has lived in pathological fear of communism, and in which a climate of hysteria has enveloped us all concerning communist ambitions for world domination, was there not any consideration given to the possibility of a communist conspiracy? Is it possible to believe our militarists, our anti-communist politicians, and our communications media would have concealed evidence of a conspiracy to kill Kennedy had such a conspiracy been or had the slightest chance of being? Yet there was, as we have seen, evidence of a conspiracy, and it was not acted upon. Why not? What did this nation so deeply fear that led it to hide from the facts of a conspiracy? What caused our government to be immobilized when action was called for? Could it have been the concept of conspiracy would have led not in the direction of a communist plot, but rather in a direction which would have been even more shocking to our own nation? whatever is the case, where action was called for, none was taken.

In fact, there was very patent evidence of conspiracy. Take for example the fatal head hit which must have come from in front of Kennedy and not from behind him. The Zapruder film makes that clear. There were too many shots, too many bullets, fired too close together for one assassin. There was evidence of an entrance wound

which Oswald could not have caused from his position behind Kennedy. Ray Marcus, a fine researcher into the assassination, has shown there was a hit at frame 189 of the Zapruder film. At that frame the President's right hand is waving. There is, thereafter a sharp jerk, and the President grasps toward his throat. Already by frame 205 the President's hand is at his throat. If the President had been shot after frame 205, the bullet would had to have gone through his hand. And before frame 205 an oak tree made a hit from the Book Depository virtually impossible for its foliage shielded the Presidential limousine from the view of any person situated on the sixth floor of the Depository Building. The analysis of Ray Marcus is a logical one, and accounts for the medical diagnosis at Parkland of an entrance wound. This evidence which supports an early wound in the President's anterior neck should have occurred to officials at least as hypothesis. Such evidence of an early frontal strike on the President should have been acted upon by the officials or at least should have added to the suspicion of the existence of more than one assassin. Arguments that there was no hit so early, even if correct, were never weighty enough, and ~~or~~ ^{are} even now not convincing. To have precluded some consideration of an earlier hit and a second assassin is indicative of official guilt.

None of the physical evidence would lead any serious investigation to the conclusion of a lone assassin, and, indeed, the only bit of such evidence linking Oswald at all to the actual assassination is, in addition to being inconclusive, highly suggestive of a frame up. Bullet 399, the one shot from Oswald's gun, was supposed to have caused a number of wounds in Kennedy and Connally, including the smashing of bones in Connally. Yet there was no blood and no tissue upon it.

Nor was there any evidence of any kind of fabric weave impressed in the metal. This bullet was intact and undeformed but for a slight flattening in its front. It was also discovered under the most unusual circumstances- not at the scene of the assassination but under the mat of a stretcher, finally determined by Commission fiat to be Connally's stretcher. This bullet could not have done the damage we are told it in fact did. Not only was it not mangled, as the test bullet shot through a cadaver wrist was, but it left more fragments in weight in Connally's wounds than it could possibly have lost, considering the heaviest weight of such a bullet.¹ Not since the theory of phlogistin with the idea of negative weight has man been asked to accept such nonsense. No official investigator who was honest could have accepted such a lie.

The overwhelming preponderance of the physical evidence just doesn't permit an inference of a lone assassin. When one says there was a conspiracy to kill Kennedy and to hide the reasons for the assassination from the public, defenders of the Commission retort "you have a big conspiracy" intending such as a reductio ad absurdum of the conspiracy thesis. Yet, on every level,

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1. Salandria, Vincent J., The Impossible Tasks of One Assassination Bullet, p. 15, "The Minority of One," March 1966.

of our federal bureaucracy there was no action where evidence called for it, and there was action to impute sole blame on Oswald where it was uncalled for.

Briefly let us review some of the most sinister of actions by the federal government's police agents respecting the evidence. Governor Connally's bullet-torn coat and shirt were ignored by the federal police for weeks, and when they were finally obtained, were dry cleaned and pressed. The dry cleaning and pressing served to obliterate vital evidence necessary for the determination of the direction and type of bullet or bullets which struck the Governor. There was the startling and incriminating action of the then Commander James J. Humes, the head of the Bethesda autopsy team, who took and burned the original autopsy notes. In a free society the Commission investigating the President's assassination was not permitted to see the X-rays and photographs which were taken of the President's body at Bethesda. Can there be any other assumption against this background of suppression that Humes burned the notes because they revealed Kennedy was shot in the front and the back and therefore his wounds were incompatible with an assassination by one man? What happened to Humes as a consequence of his sinister burning of the original autopsy notes? He was promoted from Commander to Captain. Another rational action! After admittedly burning relevant evidence in the crime of the century, a man receives a promotion from those in power!

In addition to the physical evidence already mentioned, there is photographic material, all of which raises serious questions about a conspiracy. Wesiberg has contributed a valuable book in

this material. An independent investigator, Richard E. Sprague, has also done a brilliant job of analysis. Montesana 2 and Willis 10 (photos) indicate presence and "discovery" of one and possibly two more rifles besides the one found on the sixth floor. Why was that discovery not the basis for action? The Mary A. Moorman photo shows a possible total of four men behind a concrete wall, the fence and cupola structure at the west end of the arcade. The Hughes film and the Dillard photo show the sixth floor Depository window from which Oswald allegedly did his shooting within seconds of the assassination, and there is neither Oswald nor anyone else at that window.

What we might call hard physical evidence, that relating to angles of entrance of wounds, of positions from which shots might have been fired, the physical reactions of Kennedy and Connally, the direction of flying skull matter which resulted from the fatal wound in the President's head, the medical testimony of Parkland doctors and photographic evidence all provided impressive evidence for the assumption of a conspiracy. Even if we would now regard such evidence as questionable, there was a time at which authorities had such material as their best evidence, and were therefore duty bound to but did not act upon it. If there existed evidence for a conspiracy, and dangerous criminals who assassinated the President of the United States were on the loose, then all of us would be in danger. Surely our government in not reacting to evidence of conspiracy could not have felt the assassins a threat or a danger. Why not?

It is particularly interesting that there was not a national turmoil when we consider Oswald's background and associations.

Oswald's Background and Associations

The official conclusions about Oswald are that he was a loner- an insignificant nobody. Yet it has never been established that Oswald was insane or psychologically deranged. The question of motive thus becomes crucial. There are in our society many loners, many estranged men and women, but they do not therefore kill the President. Even if the question of evidence did not establish a conspiracy, one would have to have been most concerned over the question of motive. Why did Oswald do it? If he was so unimportant a person, then had he done it, one could expect instead of insisting he was framed, he would have proclaimed to the world he himself did rid it of the President of the United States?

An immediate problem which arises involves us in the question of why Oswald, a man who renounced his citizenship, defected to the Soviet Union, asserted his intention of giving away radar secrets, and constituted par excellence by all standards of the F.B.I. and Secret Service a subversive, was not under surveillance, contrary to standard procedure, on the day of President Kennedy's motorcade through Dallas. A revealing Dallas Police Report, February 17, 1964 informs us that a Mrs. Teofil Meller saw Karl Marx's Capital at Oswald's house. Mr. Meller checked with the F.B.I. and was told Oswald "was all right." How could such a person have been "all right" to the F.B.I.? Must not inaction on the part of our government in response to "subversive" behavior of Oswald only make sense on the assumption

he was all right to our government- we was their man. Oswald always received preferential treatment- action in his favor that makes no sense whatever except on the assumption he was a government man.

Sylvia Meagher has provided a particularly valuable service in calling to our attention government inaction where there should have been action and vice versa. A "lookout card" is prepared by the State Department Passport Office in order to have adequate information in the event action should be taken to refuse a passport. When Oswald sought to renounce his citizenship at the end of October 1959 there were grounds for preparing a lookout card, but none was prepared. On two other occasions preparation of a lookout card was mandatory. One was when the Embassy lost contact with Oswald, and had no way of knowing whether he might have taken an allegiance to the Soviet Union. The second occasion was when money was advanced to Oswald by the State Department. In neither case, however, was action taken, and a lookout card was not ever prepared. Sylvia Meagher states:

"An article in the New York Times of October 20, 1963, charged that 'for the past 15 years, the (State) department has attempted to deny passports to many Americans on the ground that their travel might be embarrassing.' Yet four months before this charge was published, Oswald applied for a passport (on June 24, 1963) and it was issued to him without a murmur only 24 hours late!"

She continues:

"The radical deviation from orthodox practice where Oswald was involved cannot be dismissed as random, inadvertent, or innocent- it is too consistent and uniform, vertically and horizontally, to be attributed to recurrent clerical error. It is a pattern that makes sense only in the context of a secret arrangement which places Oswald outside of the scope of normal measures of attrition." ("Oswald and the State Department, The Minority of One, Oct. 1966, p. 24.)

There he is, Oswald, the loner! The insignificant being shown preferential treatment from the very highest places prior to the assassination. There he is, Oswald, the loner who defected with an F.B.I. informant number and a firuge for a salary of \$200.00 from that same agency. (V H 242) On January 22, 1964, Rankin was informed by Waggoner Carr, the Attorney General of Texas, that Oswald had been a paid F.B.I. informer. (V P 242) The Warren Commission undertook no independent investigation, no meaningful action to determine the veracity of this report. Is there no action, because they knew it was true? If Oswald was just a lonely nobody, why is it there are fifty-one documents classified to secret in the National Archives relating to Oswald and Ruby if both of these men are so unimportant? Why should there be action on the part of our government to suppress information about nobodies- unless they are really somebodies?

Why is it George De Mohrenschildt should have any reaction at all to Oswald? If all things were normal, as they are supposed to have been on the surface, there would be no two people less likely to have any kind of relationship than De Mohrenschildt and Oswald. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Commission Counsel, describes De Mohrenschildt for us as follows:

"...you are a man of very superior education and extremely wide experience and acquaintance here and in Europe, South America, West Indies- you have lived an extremely colorful life..."

De Mohrenschildt simply replies:

"Yes." (IX H 236)

On the next page of the testimony De Mohrenschildt describes Oswald:

"I never would believe that any government would be stupid enough to trust Lee with anything important."

Jenner asked:

"Give me the basis of your opinion."

De Mohrenschildt:

"Well, against, as I said, an unstable individual, mixed-up individual, uneducated individual, without background. What government would give him any confidential work? No government would." (IX H 237)

Why then the intimacy between this man of "superior education" (De Mohrenschildt) and this "unstable" and "mixed up" person (Oswald)? With respect to Oswald there should have been inaction on behalf of De Mohrenschildt. If Oswald seemed to be a nobody, De Mohrenschildt was surely a somebody. A former CIA agent, an acquaintance of Bill Turner (who is on the staff of and contributes articles to Ramparts and is a careful student of the assassination) told Turner the CIA would have assigned someone the task of befriending Oswald and keeping an eye on him. De Mohrenschildt could be that someone. There is no other reason why he should have shown such an interest in Oswald. De Mohrenschildt is a petroleum geologist, associates with the socially most prominent people, was suspected of being a Nazi agent during World War II, was connected with our State Department in 1957-1958 (XIX H 555), and during the forties was involved in Facts, Inc. with a partner Baron Maydell, who was accused of being a German spy and who was certainly pro Nazi.

De Mohrenschildt also went to Yugoslavia and Ghana as a geological consultant for our State Department. The Haitian government repaid him work in the form of sesal plantation. Why was this man described as one with "superior education" interested in Oswald? Why was De Mohrenschildt interested in Oswald? And finally, why was no one interested in De Mohrenschildt on the day of the assassination? The one point at which we should have expected action on the part of the government would have been in response to this subversive activities, but never is there action on the basis of those.

And why is it that this obscure, unimportant Oswald, seems to have a double leaving a false path for him? Professor Richard Popkin has carefully followed the activities of a second Oswald.¹ Who was the Leon Oswald who met Mrs. Odio, and whom she was informed spoke of killing the President? Who was the Oswald who drove a car at 70 miles an hour, when Lee Harvey Oswald couldn't drive? Who was the Oswald who informed the automobile salesman he would soon come into money, and who told another salesman he was planning to go to Russia? Who was the Oswald who made a public nuisance of himself at a shooting range? Who was the Oswald who had a telescopic sight put on his rifle? In all cases the Commission tells us it wasn't Lee Harvey Oswald. Then who was it? What was he doing? Why was he doing this? The point is ^{that} the actions of Oswald, of his associates, or doubles, are not consistent with an interpretation on the basis of coincidence.

Oswald was given the most preferential treatment. No unfavorable action was taken against him when such action was called for. This was all before the assassination. After the assassination unfavorable action was taken against him, where it was not called for. The physical and eyewitness of the officials themselves didn't justify an inference of guilt on behalf of Oswald. The paraffin test was not consistent with his having fired a rifle because there were no nitrate deposits on his cheek.

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1. Popkin, Richard H., The Second Oswald, New York. Avon Books, 1966.

The main witness against Oswald, Brennan, was unable to identify him in a line up, and Oswald did not confess to having committed any crimes. Rather, he said he was framed. That doesn't mean he was, but it was a charge nonetheless that could well have been considered. The government was obligated to consider the hypothesis of a frame, because the Secret Service had been given a tape by the Intelligence Division of the Miami Police Department several days after November 9, 1963 which tape described an actual plot uncovered in Miami to kill President Kennedy. The informant described how a patsy would be provided to throw the public off the real trail of the conspirators. ¹ But, the authorities ignored this Miami revelation in interpreting Oswald's possible role in the assassination. They ignored it although the bullet designated Commission Exhibit 399 tipped itself off as a plant flying into the case as it did without benefit of blood, tissue, weight loss or deformation.

Again we see the pattern. There was prejudicial action taken against Oswald after the assassination. This official action wasn't justified by the very data authorities were themselves presenting as evidence. Before the assassination, when there was a justification for action against Oswald, none was taken. This pattern is only consistent with a frame-up, and

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1. Jones, Jr., Penn, Loc. Cit., p. 47.

this frame-up must go up to the highest levels-those levels which prevent our knowing information concerning Oswald's relationship with the government. It certainly goes up to the Warren Commission, which refused to consider any evidence bearing unfavorably on a lone assassin theory.

Further, it is interesting that while Oswald was arrested without real evidence, and tenaciously clung to as the lone assassin, no such action was taken against others who may have been suspicious. Only action against Oswald, where it most probably was unjustified, but none against others where it might have been justified. As we have already observed, Richard Sprague has brought the fact to our attention that a number of arrests were made after the assassination. There is photographic evidence of this. What happened to these men? Why were they not regarded with more suspicion considering the fact there was sufficient suspicion to arrest them- at a time the military was informing the new leaders there was no conspiracy.

A most interesting figure is Igor Vaganov. I am not suggesting he is guilty of anything, but he was sufficiently suspicious for the F.B.I. to question him for two hours. He was an excellent shot; carried a gun; turned up in Dallas not long before the assassination; left shortly thereafter, ^{and} fit the description of one of the men Aquilla Clemons said she saw kill Officer Tippit. He had a red Thunderbird and, Domingo Benavides, one of the witnesses to Tippit's murder, saw a man in a "red Ford." Tippit was shot with a .38 caliber revolver, the same kind Vaganov had with him. Further, Vaganov's whereabouts during the killing of Tippit haven't been substantiated. And the evening before the assassination,

Anne Vaganov was hysterical, and she called her sister to tell her that her husband "Turk"- Igor Vaganov, was going to do "something horrible tomorrow." (Esquire, August, 1967, p. 122)

Now all of this is circumstantial, and we need come to no conclusion of guilt on Vaganov's part. That is irrelevant in any case. The point is that he was a most suspicious person, and one might have expected after the assassination of our President more interest in him. Why was there not further action taken against him at the time? Even though he may have been cleared subsequently, in a situation during which a desperate search was supposed to be in process for solution of the mystery of the President's assassination, one would have expected federal authorities to have been less generous with someone in Vaganov's predicament. Yet, Vaganov told Salandria in an interview that at about 3 P.M. of November 22, 1963 the F.B.I. agents left him after calling their Dallas headquarters and learning that "They got him." So early? Again, they knew before they could know who the assassin was, and that he was alone in his work.

One might also be curious concerning why there was not a greater interest in Mrs. Ruth Paine, a Quaker, who helped Oswald to get a job at the Book Depository and who was supposed to have carried his rifle into the Dallas area, and who played other vital roles which no conspiracy could have left to chance. We certainly do not advocate paranoia on behalf of police in investigation of crimes, but based on past action, we know the police have a suspicious mentality, and we cannot help but wonder what happened to this characteristic bent of mind here.

Finally, it should be observed, that on the Commission's construction of the kind of person Oswald was, his actions seem to make no sense. Indeed, where he has acted, one should have expected inaction. Why did Oswald, if he was a pro Marxist and leftist loner, go out of his way to associate with left-wing groups before killing the President? He had associations with the Communist Party, Fair Play for Cuba, Socialist Labor Party, American Civil Liberties Union, and a person (Michael Paine) with some associations with the Socialist Workers Party. His family also lived with a Quaker. If he had any sympathy toward the left, he was doing it no favor by openly associating himself with such groups, before murdering the President. Such action would have been incredible- the exact opposite would be expected. The only reasonable interpretation is that Oswald wittingly or unwittingly was setting up the left for some agency which had predesignated him as the lone patsy in the Kennedy killing.

Whereever we should expect action to solve the mystery of the President's murder, we find inaction. And where we should expect inaction, we find action. In noting this pattern, it is significant to keep in mind the fact that, according to the New York Times, November 27, 1963: "Dallas authorities announced that they were turning over all evidence to the Federal Bureau of Investigation." This means that there was a lack of action, where there should have been action to solve the assassination, and that this inaction was at the federal level. The federal authorities assumed a monopoly over the evidence.*

It must be emphasized that in rehashing evidence and facts pertaining to the assassination that have long been discussed by critics we are not judging such evidence, but only making what we regard to be the very important observation that such evidence should have been acted upon, even though it might subsequently have been proven baseless. This is important, for the clear implication is that in light of evidence of a conspiracy our authorities had no fear about the conspirators, and could feel safe while refraining from action directed at apprehending them. What is interesting and merits further exploration is that this pattern of action where it is uncalled for, and inaction where there should be action, may be discerned in major foreign policy behavior of the post assassination government.

Post Assassination Foreign Policy Shift

We have heard it said that one of the reasons one may have found inaction on the part of the government, such as failure to place road blocks or cut off transportation from the assassination side, by whatever means, may have been due to the fact that there was a traumatization as a result of the assassination. What is revealing, however, is that the same government which has failed to act for over four years on evidence suggesting a conspiracy, actually swing into amazingly fast action in an area where one might have anticipated a slow feeling of the way. The fact is that after the assassination key foreign policy changes were immediately put into effect.

Even considering the fact that the new President's views on foreign policy differed from those of President Kennedy, on the basis of a natural reaction to the death of Kennedy, one might have expected a slower changeover. After all, President Johnson's area of expertise is not foreign policy, and therefore one might have expected caution in changes that may have come. To the contrary, however, extensive changes were in the works shortly after the assassination. In particular there seems to have been an almost immediate change in orientation to the third world. There is much reason to believe the Cold War was dying out in Europe, and that the end of it was to a great extent symbolized by the beginning of new relations with Russia evidenced by Kennedy's Test Ban Treaty. Kennedy had already understood the need for a world built on something more firm than is possible in the context of the Cold War. He saw very clearly his chance to end the Cold War. Drew Pearson, in his Washington Merry-Go-Round column of January 23, 1963 outlined the crossroad at which President Kennedy and humanity had arrived at that critical time:

"President Kennedy today faces his greatest opportunity to negotiate a permanent peace, but because of division inside his own Administration he may miss the boat.

"That is the consensus of friendly diplomats long trained in watching the ebb and flow of world events...

"Here are the reasons why Mr. Kennedy is now sitting on top of the diplomatic world when it comes to settling Berlin and other problems of the cold war..."

Pearson then outlined the then existing conditions which led the United States and Russia to the "brink of agreement." President Kennedy understood these conditions. In his American University address he set them forth:

"Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war...not merely peace for Americans, but peace for all men; not merely peace in our time but peace for all time."
(Sorenson, Theodore C., Kennedy, p. 823,
New York, Harper & Row, 1965.)

Sorenson further tells us, "He challenged his listeners to look anew at the Soviet Union and the Cold War, to put past conflicts and prejudices behind them and to concentrate interests shared by both powers." (Ibid. p. 824.)

President Eisenhower had eloquently warned us of the military-industrial-complex, and its danger to our liberties. If the Cold War would end, this would jar the power of influential figures in the military-industrial-complex, to the munitions and missile interests and the Pentagon.

"The nature of the Cold War Institutional Machine suggests there is little hope in trying to convert it to other purposes. For the body of ideology and techniques that differentiates the staffs of these institutions is highly specific to a military power-based orientation. That is why the problem is one of dismantling, which means folding up the organization and, at the same time, seeking constructive opportunities for the able men and women engaged in these units." (Melman, Seymour, Our Depleted Society, p. 236. New York, Delta, 1965)

Yet, in an important sense the end of the Cold War in Europe was an accomplished fact. In their interesting study After 20 Years, Barnett and Raskin make the following observations:

"We wrote this book because it appears that for the first time in many years a confluence of American, Soviet, and European political interests may now make it possible to end the great confrontation between East and West over the future of Europe. A significant shift in the relations of the super powers to Europe and to each other now seems plausible..." (p.vii)

and

"...economic pressures, such as the gold flow problem, political pressures, such as the anti-Nato campaign of de Gaulle, and technological pressures, such as the growing adolescence of the bases encircling the Soviet Union, are pushing the United States towards unilateral military disengagement. (p. 89)

and

"After the Cuban crisis, the Soviets appeared increasingly interested in a detente based on tacit understanding between principal antagonists. They cut the defense budget and, then, production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons in response to similar moves by the United States..." (p. 90)

Now, if the Cold War ended in Europe, how could the Cold Warriors adjust? They could go out of business, or discover a new theater in which to enact and reproduce the Cold War- that theater would, of course, be the third world- Asia-Africa-Latin America. There is evidence, however, that when Kennedy thought in terms of ending the Cold War in Europe he had no plans for beginning it in the third world. All evidence available that establishes Kennedy was becoming unhappy about Viet Nam in particular, and from all available evidence it is most unlikely that developments would have taken the course they have had Kennedy lived.

Johnson and Foreign Policy

The most important change following the assassination of President Kennedy occurred precisely in the area of foreign policy, particularly with respect to Asia and Latin America. Of course, to note such change is not to prove it was a deliberate consequence of the assassination. Yet as a key variable careful examination of that change becomes necessary, if we wish to understand what is going on. It might be one thing to observe Johnson's orientation to foreign policy is different from Kennedy's, and therefore one could expect such changes. But it is another thing to note at the very moment President Johnson was affirming continuation of Kennedy's program for peace, and searching for means to end the Cold War, momentous changes were being made which would make peace impossible and renew the Cold War. Here was a pattern of

action where we might have expected inaction at least until a longer period of adjustment was realized. This, of course, is not to suggest that President Johnson himself was involved in the assassination. Two observations here are relevant. One is that generally speaking Johnson was more weak in the realm of foreign affairs than in domestic. The second consideration is that his views on foreign policy would still be consistent with the militarists, and his interests would be identified with influential power in the military-industrial-complex. Thus, without implying any guilt of Johnson, it must be realized that if the Cold Warriors wanted to ensure the continuation of the Cold War in a new theater of operation, they could depend upon Johnson, and they could control him where they could not control Kennedy.

William S. White, in The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson, p. 130, Greenwich, Conn. 1964 sets forth Johnson's view on Asia as stated in a memorandum to President Kennedy dated May 23, 1961 following Johnson's visit to the Far East:

"The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there- or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asians Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts-Philippines, Japan, Taiwan- have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.

"The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost...

"There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia." (pp. 153-154)

Johnson stated in 1961 what our policy has become after Kennedy's assassination.

Kennedy and Military Take Over

It may seem irresponsible to conceive of a military plot to eliminate Kennedy, and ensure continuation of the Cold War. However, we must realize for one thing that Kennedy was not only becoming more difficult to control, but he himself, in his position of great authority, and from a vantage point at which there was much information unavailable to us, did not regard a military take-over as implausible. We have an excellent articulation of his feeling on this matter in a discussion with Paul B. Fay, Jr.¹ This colloquy occurred one summer weekend in 1962 on the Honey Fitz, the Kennedy yacht. The President was asked what he thought of the possibility of a military take-over in the United States. The discussion grew out of the book Seven Days in May by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey.

President Kennedy said: "It's possible. It could happen in this country, but the conditions would have to be just right."

The conditions the President outlined were as follows:

- (1) The country would be led by a young President,
- (2) There would be a Bay of Pigs,
- (3) Military criticism of the President would follow,
- (4) Then if there was another Bay of Pigs the military

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1. Fay, Paul B. Jr., The Pleasure of His Company, p. 190.
New York, Harper & Row, 1963.

would consider over-throwing the elected establishment, and finally.

- (5) "Then if there were a third Bay of Pigs, it could happen."

Mr. Fay concluded this episode by describing how the President: "Pausing long enough for all of us to assess the significance of his comment, ...concluded with an old Navy phrase: 'But it won't happen on my watch.'"

These conditions were approximated in the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy was in fact a young President. There was a Bay of Pigs. The missile crisis which followed, resulted not in the bombing of Cuba- as the military advisors had pressed upon the President¹ but rather in a detente with Russia. This was followed by a nuclear test ban treaty which: "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared themselves opposed to...under almost any terms."²

Theodore C. Sorensen further detailed the opposition of the American military to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:

"Confronted with an actual treaty limiting the development of weapons, the Chiefs began to hedge..."

"Repeatedly, and ultimately successfully, Kennedy and McNamara reassured them that underground testing would continue our nuclear progress. Air Force Chief LeMay acknowledged that he would have opposed the treaty had it not already been initialed; and his Strategic Air Command General Thomas Powers flatly denounced it..." -54-

1. Schelsigner, Arthur M., *op. cit.*, p. 896.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 818.

3. Sorensen, Theodore C., *op. cit.*, p. 213.

"The treaty...encountered heavy attack...from... former Chiefs of Staff Arleigh Burke, Arthur Radford and Nathan Twining. The Air Force Association composed of military, former military and defense contractors, came out against it."¹

The American University Speech followed by his reexamination of the Vietnamese policy (to be discussed later)- completely fulfilled the conditions set forth by President Kennedy for a take-over to happen on his watch. In fact, President Kennedy was doing his job right, and he very well knew that doing his job right in Cold War American might cost his life.

"...when he saw Nixon after the Bay of Pigs he said. 'If I do the right kind of a job, I don't know whether I am going to be here four years from now.' Nor could anyone interest him much in details of personal protection. 'If someone is going to kill me,' he would say, 'they are going to kill me.'"²

Kennedy's Quest for Peace Dies with Him

In any event, when President Kennedy was no longer on watch, the quest for peace was crushed. D.F. Flemming, the distinguished scholar on the Cold War, described this critical peace-making phase of President Kennedy and the abrupt end "which was the consequence of his assassination:

"Fortunately, we had in President Kennedy at a new turning point in history a leader with both vision and courage. He had made certain that there were no missile gaps against us. He had won the acclaim of the West by the way he successfully played showdown nuclear politics in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. He had faced the last of man's ultimate decisions on earth.

"Then, in the summer of 1963, Kennedy turned his face resolutely toward life and unmistakably

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1. Sorensen, Theodore C., op. cit. pp. 738-739.
2. Schlesinger, Jr. Arthur M. op. cit. p. 676.

signaled the end of the Cold War. Behind the patriotic facade of nuclear militarism he saw the death of his own children and of all children. In a series of magnificent addresses, he urged us to reconsider our attitudes toward peace, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. He won a treaty ending atomic testing above ground and then paused to wait a little for the more embattled of his cold-war compatriots to catch up with the times.

"At that moment he was struck down..."

"Is this to happen again, for the third and last time? Are we really about to plunge into another twenty years of escalating period of the final world war in a self-defeating effort to control the fringes of China militarily? Should we not rather join in welcoming the great Chinese people belatedly into the twentieth century? And, above all, can we move fast enough really to organize the unity of mankind while there is still time?"¹

In seeking to keep the path of peace open, President Kennedy had reminded us of the ancient Chinese proverb, that a journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step. President Kennedy took that little single step, particularly with the Test Ban Treaty, symbolizing the failure of the Cold War in Europe, but then he was shot dead.

What Johnson Says and What the Military Does

President Johnson said, "To the protestation and enlargement of this new hope for peace I pledge my country, and its government."

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1. Fleming, D.F. "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, p. 137. Philadelphia, 1966.

1. The New York Times, Dec. 2, 1963.

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President Johnson further declared that the assassination of Mr. Kennedy "...did not alter his nation's purpose."¹

But, the nation's purpose with respect to the very matter President Johnson was addressing himself to was already being very substantially altered, and a step backward away from the path of peace was being taken. In September of 1963 President Kennedy had stated that the war was for the Vietnamese to win or lose. It was not to be an American war. Arthur Schlesinger tells us:

"President Kennedy did not believe the war in Vietnam could succeed as a war of white men against Asians. 'It could not be won,' he said, a few weeks before his death, 'unless the people (of South Vietnam) support the effort... We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men as their advisors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam.'"²

And Senator Morse has apprised us of the fact that "Mr. Kennedy told him 10 days before he was felled by an assassin's bullet in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963 that he was reexamining Viet Nam Policy."³

More revealing, however, is what we are told in the excellent study of negotiations, The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam:

"It is important to recall, in this regard, the stated intention of the Kennedy administration, as announced by McNamara and Taylor from the White House on October 2, 1963, which was to withdraw most U.S. Forces from South Vietnam by the end of 1965...."

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1. The New York Times, Dec. 18, 1963.
2. Schlesinger, Jr. Arthur M. A Middle Way out of Vietnam, "New York Times Magazine", Sept. 18, 1966, p. 114.
3. The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 26, 1966.

"Three weeks after the assassination, on December 19 and 20, 1963, McNamara and CIA chief John A. McCone visited Saigon to evaluate the war efforts of the new Saigon government. McNamara told the junta leaders that the United States was prepared to help...as long as aid was needed." (New York Times, January 2, 1964, p. 7)...

"...the United States had made the crucial decision to reverse the policy, announced during the last days of President Kennedy's administration, of gradually withdrawing U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Was it all a coincidence that a change in leadership in Washington was followed by a change in policy, and a change in policy by a corresponding change in Saigon's government?"¹

Thus, at the time President Johnson was assuring the world through the United Nations that he was following in President Kennedy's footsteps in seeking peace and an end to the Cold War, he was in fact and deed adopting policies which would prolong the war in Asia and keep the Cold War boiling. Of course, one could always say that conditions changed and Johnson was forced by them to alter Kennedy's approach- one could say that, but it wouldn't be true. For if conditions changed, they did so in a manner even less conducive to a policy of escalation. The authors of The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam tell us:

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1. Schurmann, Franz, Scott, Peter Dale, and Zelnick, Reginald, The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam, pp. 32-33, Fawcett, N.Y. 1966.

"One conclusion can be asserted unequivocally: The United States increased its commitment to a prolongation of the Vietnam war at a time when the drift of the Saigon junta and of public opinion was in the direction of negotiations for a neutralized Vietnam."¹

Why a Foreign Policy Shift- The Essential Question

Unquestionably then, here again we have definite action in a context which calls for none. That there should have been a change in Vietnamese policy so immediately after the murder of Kennedy when the external situation in Vietnam did not evoke it raises serious questions about what caused it in our internal situation. What is at stake here is not an academic issue, not an argument about technicalities of how the assassination was done, but fundamental questions concerning why it was done. At issue are questions of war and peace that involve the whole of humanity. Not only is it not irresponsible to raise questions concerning why there are basic changes in foreign policy in the administration that is vowing to uphold the peaceful policies of the murdered President, but rather not to raise such questions is to be guilty of reckless cowardice.

If we are wrong in supposing there is a deliberate correlation between the change in foreign policy and the assassination, really little is to be lost except our face, which is not worth one human being's one minute of life. If, however, we are right, there is a
2. Ibid. pp. 32-33.

world to be saved, and the life of the experiment we call man. We are now sinking fast in the magic quicksand of the Vietnamese War led by a man who vows he is supporting the policies of President Kennedy who was in favor of an opposite policy. In the New York Times of November 25, 1967 it was reported that Roger Hilsman, head of Intelligence in the State Department and later Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, resigned from the Johnson Administration in 1964 because President Johnson was planning to ditch the Kennedy policy in favor of a military solution. The New York Times described Hilsman as a "key policy making official in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations." (New York Times, Feb. 26, 1964.)

Arthur Schlesinger, who was a Special Assistant and speech writer for Kennedy has said of Kennedy concerning Vietnam:

"He was somber and shaken. I had not seen him so depressed since the Bay of Pigs. No doubt he realized Vietnam was his great failure in foreign policy, and that he had never really given it his full attention." (New York Times, Nov. 25, 1965.)

Indeed, while the military has been getting a green light from the highest office in our land since the death of Kennedy, such was not the case prior to that tragic event. I.F. Stone calls to our attention the fact that Arhtur Krock in his New York Times column of February 14, 1965 "disclosed for the first time that Kennedy turned down a proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send 40,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam." According to Stone, President Kennedy told Mr. Krock that "he still believed...the U.S. military should not become involved on the Asian mainland."

He emphasized this should be so particularly in "civil disturbances created by guerillas." Stone sums up by saying, "What both Eisenhower and Kennedy refused to do Johnson has now done. He has landed U.S. combat troops in Asia." (I.F. Stone's Weekly, March 15, 1965)

This militarization of our policy was in the planning stages long before it was supposed to have been brought about by external forces. Thus at the very time President Johnson was posing as a peace candidate against Barry Goldwater, Charles Roberts, had informed us in his book LBJ's Inner Circle¹ that he had already planned to escalate the war. The plans to escalate the war to North Vietnam were made, according to this account, in October 1964.

One can never be sure about what a man would have done had he lived longer. Perhaps, President Kennedy would have escalated the war in Vietnam. Yet, the evidence we have, while not by any means air tight, certainly suggests Kennedy would not have militarized the war. It strongly suggests the very opposite. He was not so permissive with the military and mounting questions were raising themselves to him over the war in Vietnam. At the time of his death the door was open to peace in Vietnam. In the light of what appears to have been his changing attitude, there is reason to believe he would at least have explored the possibility of walking through it. After his assassination, however, the door was securely closed.

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1. Roberts, Charles, LBJ's Inner Circle, pp. 20-22,

In their most carefully reasoned work, The United States in Vietnam, Kahin and Lewis assert the following:

"Dien's death initially appeared to open up possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question. Public feeling against the war began to be expressed more openly in Saigon and other cities, and both the politically active Buddhist and student elements advocated pursuit of a neutralist solution to the conflict.

"General Duong Van Minh received a manifesto (dated Nov. 8) from the NLF that called on 'the parties concerned in South Vietnam (to) negotiate with one another to reach a cease-fire...'"¹

The manifesto further advocated a policy of neutrality and the establishment of friendly relations with all countries.

JOHNSON

Johnson's Policy in Vietnam

But the Johnson policy was a quick revision of Kennedy's plan to return troops by 1965. Clearly action was evinced where external conditions did not require any. Whatever the motivation, clearly the Cold War had been moved to Asia.

It cannot be too much emphasized that the definite and deliberate militarization of policy was quickly put into action throughout the Cold War after the death of President Kennedy. There was no evidence of governmental traumatization, no careful reconsideration, but a most efficient and abrupt movement from politico-economic policies to military ones.

"Let us continue" was the motto of the post-assassination government, but efforts for peace were not continued. Where a basis for action in behalf of peace was set into action by the

¹ Kahin, George McTurnan and Lewis, John W., The United States in Vietnam, p. 151f, New York, Delta, 1967.

Kennedy administration, it was discontinued by the Johnson administration. Here, where work had been done in an effort to achieve detente, if there really were a desire to continue the policies of Kennedy action, peace moves, rather than inaction would have been natural.

Kennedy and Normalization of Relations with Cuba

Thanks to a book by William Attwood, The Reds and Blacks,¹ we know President John F. Kennedy responded favorably to Castro's overtures for a resumption of diplomatic relations. President Kennedy approved Attwood's talking to Dr. Carlos Lechunga, the chief Cuban delegate to the United Nations. The result was the idea of setting up private talks with Castro in Cuba. Robert Kennedy actually proposed representatives of the two governments first meet in Mexico. Bundy told Attwood that the President, more than the State Department, was interested in the possible meeting. On November 19 Bundy told Attwood the President wanted to see him immediately after he met with Lechunga. The President, Bundy made clear, would be available, except for "a brief trip to Dallas."

Soon after the assassination, Attwood met Lechunga who told him he had been instructed by Castro on November 23 to begin formal discussion. But, as Attwood makes clear, all efforts for

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1. Attwood, William, The Reds and the Blacks, New York, Harper & Row, 1967.

detente with Cuba died with the President.

Certainly there could have been diplomatic action here to improve relations, and calm down world tensions. Castro was certainly ready for better diplomatic relations. It was reported in the New York Times, January 2, 1964:

"Premier Fidel Castro said yesterday in a telephone interview from Havana that he was 'hopeful' that good relations with the United States might be resumed this year. He added that the next move was up to Washington.

"He said that until President's Kennedy's 'tragic death,' he believed that 'an eventual normalization of relations with the Kennedy administration was possible.

"The Cuban leader said he was uncertain about relations with President Johnson, but emphasized he was 'hopeful.'"

There certainly are interests who are chilled at the thought not of war but peace. There are interests who prefer world tensions, and who would never be satisfied with good relations with Castro. Castro himself was aware of this, and what is interesting is that he explicitly denied John F. Kennedy could be identified with these interests. In a talk with Castro, Jean Daniel was told the following:

"'I believe Kennedy is sincere,' Fidel declared. 'I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance...'" (Daniel, Jean, "Unofficial Envoy," The New Republic, Dec. 14, 1963, p. 17.)

Castro further asserted:

"For years and years American policy- not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon- has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a president arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the lowers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United States no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised...the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him? The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one." (Ibid. p. 19)

So, we see that with the death of Kennedy there is a new approach to the underdeveloped countries of Central and Latin America. Castro did not consider Kennedy an enemy. He looked to him to develop into a great President. Schlesinger speaks further of Castro's views on Kennedy as reported by Jean Daniel:

"He denounced Washington and the CIA. Still, of Kennedy, Castro said he could 'be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev...he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse.'"¹

Castro was right. The new government which took power after Kennedy's death assumed a tough and militaristic approach to the aspirations of the underdeveloped and aspiring nations of the world. After Kennedy's death, the new administration, while avowing to continue his enlightened policies, were among those

1. Schlesinger, Arthur M., op.cit. p. 1000.

who sabotaged his liberal policies in foreign affairs. After the assassination, despite claims to the contrary, there was a thorough going change in our foreign policy with respect to the third world. Vietnam became crucially important. Already on December 14, 1963, military juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras were recognized. And during January and February of 1964 economic and military aid programs were set back in action.

This constituted a direct repudiation of Kennedy's policy of diplomatic, military and economic boycott of the military regimes in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Kennedy's program of boycotting hurt the anti-democratic military leaders. Johnson's program put them back in business. With Johnson, and the bringing into office of Thomas Mann, a new doctrine, the Mann doctrine, meant that the United States would not work against forces of tyranny, against military camps or the right-wing dictatorships. The fight for justice, human rights and social and economic welfare was buried with J.F.K. This humane approach of President Kennedy was quickly changed for the policy of military intervention and support of dictatorship just so long as it wore an anti-communist label.

In the spring of 1964 we saw the storm of overthrowing the Gularat government. This was hailed by President Johnson, and our State Department and played up by our news media as a great triumph for forces of anti communism. I.F. Stone commented:

"Two symbols of the new Johnsonian orientation toward military dictatorship in the hemisphere were confirmed to office by the Senate Feb. 25, in an almost empty chamber, on a voice vote... One was Jack Hood Vaughan to become head of the Peace Corps. The other was Lincoln Gordon to succeed Vaughan as Assistant Secretary

of State for Inter-American Affairs. Vaughn has become an apologist for military take-over. Gordon as Ambassador to Brazil favored the overthrow of its constitutional President by a cabal of the military, the landed oligarchy and urban property."

Stone continued to note:

"Our instant support of the military was regarded as signalling the end of Kennedyism. (as Le. Monde said at the time)..." (I.F. Stone's Weekly, March 7, 1966, p. 3.)

From our perspective, the elimination of Goulart was taken as a great day for democracy. The Nation specified some of the great developments for democracy:

"There have been 8,000 arrests. Forty (or is it sixty by now?) members of the Brazilian congress have been expelled. An old line general is running the show. Everyone who proposed a decent system of taxation, or abolishing illiteracy or enlarging the franchise, or giving land to the peasants, is a communist..." (The Nation, April 27, 1964, p. 406.)

What is significant is not that President Johnson called into office men who might better express his own political style or views, but that powerful interests, particularly those advocating a military hard line, who had to be held in check by Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, were now being given their own way. It is not that the military and the military-industrial complex were not always a threat and danger, and it is not that they always did not exert a tremendous influence, but it is that after the assassination, it seemed almost more as if they were in control rather than merely being influential. In the Dominican Republic hopes for a pro democratic regime were crushed by the active intervention of the United States. Theodore Draper says:

"The evidence is now overwhelming that the '65 pro-Bosch bid for power would have been a bloodless success in the first 36 hours but for the subsequent realization by the Dominican military leaders that the U.S. government did not want them to submit or the revolt to succeed..." ("A Case of Defamation," The New Republic, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 16.)

In a New Republic editorial it was observed: •

"John F. Kennedy in 1962 at the time of the Cuban missile crisis acted only after irrefutable evidence was at hand of Soviet placement of intermediate ballistic missiles in Cuba. Even then, and despite the urgent need for speed, Mr. Kennedy consulted with O.A.S. every step of the way. Moreover he knew his own mind and his advisers knew he knew it, so they could and did push a variety of ideas at him hard. Who is pushing today, and what? When so called "hawks" present their views to Mr. Johnson, they seem to be pushing at an open door, which, however, is denied to less simple-minded suggestions." (The New Republic, May 15, 1965, p. 5.)

The Great Society Equals a Military Society

Now all that is being maintained is that despite pledges to continue the peaceful policies of Kennedy, President Johnson's administration in fact marked a predominance of military influence, and that the Great Society is primarily a Military Society. Increasingly problems are understood in terms of military and police solution rather than philosophical, economic or social ones. And, of course, the Vietnamese war means increasing militarization and brutalization of our society. Dissent, which must be the primary strength of a free society, is becoming more and more fragile. What is of concern is not that after the death of Kennedy new policies were put into effect, but that we seem to be virtually living under a new form of government, one in which no democratic pressures

have effect.

The most frightening thing about the Vietnamese War is not the madness of it which is so often observed, but the method in the madness. No democratic, political, religious, moral protests, not world opinion nor the desire of world leaders nor the Pope has much effect. There is a systematic escalation which has grown every second without any pause since the assassination. This escalation is planned beyond democratic processes. The people in this society have not been granted an opportunity to see relevant evidence concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. If we were free, we would have a right to know what happened to our President.

We are waging a war without the approval of Congress. Irreversible decisions for escalation are made independently of congressional or popular approval. What is frightening is not that after the assassination that new policies were put into effect. That would be natural. What is frightening is that more than ever democracy seems to have been put out of effect. One who regards democracy as a precious way of political life must feel concerned and must seek for the causes of this dangerous situation. No such inquiry could be valid if the question were not raised concerning whether changes were an accidental consequence of the assassination rather a deliberate consequence.

Again, it should be emphasized that to assume the assassination was politically motivated, and aimed at bringing about basic changes in foreign policy, is not at all to make any accusation against President Johnson. We must assume any individual is innocent until prove guilty. What is certain, however, is the fact that if there were powerful interests who desired Kennedy killed to change foreign policy it would have been clear to such interests that Lyndon Johnson would serve them.

Johnson's forte may never have been foreign policy, but at the same time he has been identified with the most frozen elements in the Cold War spectrum. On July 12, 1950 President Johnson in support of Korean war effort called for all out mobilization. Selig S. Harrison points out "Johnson's speech was notable for its total preoccupation with Pentagon details..." (Lyndon Johnson's World, The New Republic, June 13, 1960) Prior to the fall of Dienbienphu, Johnson was in the very hard line camp of John Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford. Harrison points out in speaking of Johnson that

"On January 28, 1955, having returned safely to the Senate, he pushed through for the White House the resolution authorizing the deployment of U.S. armed forces for the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores. He fought the unsuccessful (74-13) Lehman amendment to exempt the off shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the scope of the resolution. Against in 1956, with no election in sight, he went out of his way to stress his agreement with Senator Knowland in reiterating bipartisan opposition to Chinese admittance to the United Nations."

This is not to say President Johnson's entire record in foreign policy is consistently identifiable with a rightest position, but that it shows he could well be used by militant Cold Warriors. One of the valuable services rendered by I.F. Stone has been to criticize Goodwin for promoting the myth Johnson was a dove in 1954. Stone notes:

"As long as Eisenhower pursued a hard line in Latin America as in Asia, he had Johnson's backing. Johnson sponsored the 'Monroe Doctrine' resolution supporting Dulles' efforts to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala. Johnson's only other difference with the Republican administration that year also found him to the right of Ike. Johnson stood with Knowland in asserting that the U.S. would not support the U.N. if it admitted Red China..." (I.F. Stone Weekly, Oct. 3, 1966.

Johnson has also been a good friend of the C.I.A. In 1956 Johnson, as Majority leader of the Senate, brought tremendous pressure against a bill sponsored by Mansfield and supported by John F. Kennedy to put the C.I.A. under surveillance. The defeat of the bill owed much to the opposition of Johnson. In 1966 President Johnson again stood in strong opposition to efforts to put the C.I.A. under surveillance.

The point is, if the purpose of the assassination was a change in foreign policy, one need not regard Johnson as involved. He could be counted upon to behave subsequently in the "right" way. Powerful interests trust him. Extreme rightist and oil billionaire, H.L. Hunt claims, "I personally intervened to get Lyndon Johnson to take the Vice Presidency." (Robert G. Sherrill, "H.L. Hunt, Portrait of a Super-Patriot," The Nation, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 186.)

And I. Irving Davidson, influential Washington lobbyist representing Latin American dictatorships, told Fulbright in Congressional hearings:

"...and I wanted to do everything in my power that a man like Lyndon would get the Democratic nomination because I knew he understood the threat of Communism in the Western Hemisphere..." (I.F. Stone's Weekly, June 21, 1965)

In the same issue I.F. Stone informs us that Davidson worked on behalf of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua and was a Washington representative for the Murchison's of Texas, who have interests in Haiti and Nicaragua. What is interesting is that when the Justice Department asked Davidson to register as an agent for Joaquin Balaguer, he claimed he was working for the State Department. He said he had been promised a house-cleaning in the Central American section of the State Department to get rid of elements not sufficiently anti-communist. In 1966 he tried to get the Republican nomination for Nixon and the Democratic for Johnson. (Ibid) We suppose; that's really faith in the two party system.

What is significant about this material, we think is this- ever since his American University address Kennedy was not playing the Cold War game well, and certainly that constituted a threat to very powerful interests. Lyndon Johnson could be expected to play the game very well. Such considerations, of course, by no means establish a proof that the assassination was for foreign policy purposes, but they do establish a motive. We think the best motive. The Warren Commission purports to explain the crime of the century, and fails to do as much as to include an account of motivation. That Oswald was not insane but a lonely man who didn't fit in well with society hardly is a consideration which convinces he therefore killed the President. He could have better joined a lonely hearts club. What motivation could there have been for the assassination? If there was a conspiracy to kill the President, one way we would have to attempt to reconstruct motivation after the fact would be in terms of what might have been expected as a result of the assassination coupled with what effort was then made to realize such expectations. Clearly, thinking of the assassination in such terms, we can see one primary element, and that is foreign policy.

Kennedy's Assassination and Foreign Policy Change- a Causal Relationship?

Thus far what we have been saying is that primary changes since the assassination of President Kennedy have been in the area of foreign policy, and on the basis of that we should examine further and more specifically to see if there is a causal relation. We can say that assuming the assassination of President Kennedy had as its purpose fundamental changes in foreign policy, then events subsequent to his murder would have been predictable.

Of course, it must be realized that there is the danger of being guilty of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. We can't say for certainty the changes in foreign policy following upon the death of President Kennedy were caused and were intended to be caused by his murder and as the fulfillment of a plan to murder him. It is even possible that, had Kennedy lived, the war in Vietnam might still have been escalated. For it is most difficult to be confident when one deals with counterfactual conditionals. Yet we can say the weight of evidence suggests Kennedy would never have escalated the war in the manner of the post-assassination powers, and we must also remember we are dealing not with mathematical equations, but with human political ones. Consequently, we can't even expect perfection or certainty. Thus we can say there is certainly reason for concern in the light of the vast changes in foreign policy which were put in motion almost immediately after the assassination.

Methodologically our suspicions are reinforced by the consideration that not only are changes in foreign policy which have taken place predictable, on the assumption of a sinister plan to murder Kennedy to alter his efforts to end the Cold War, but considering subsequent political events, one could almost post dict the assassination. This is particularly the case with respect to Vietnam.

In Vietnam- What the Military Wants it Gets

Vietnam constitutes an especially important area with respect to this behavioral pattern of action where it is not called for and inaction where action is called for. This is so much the case, that critics have regarded the carrying out of the war as irrational or even mad. Yet, no one who carefully studies the history of negotiations could possibly assume irrationality. When we deal with the concept of rationality we are dealing with an idea which

involves adjusting the means so as to get the most efficiency in achieving a given end. If the end of the war in Vietnam may itself be irrational from the standpoint of human standards, in terms of achieving the end of continuing the Cold War, every move is perfectly rational. What dramatically impresses one about the escalation in Vietnam, is the very deliberate, systematic character of it.

Since the President ordered the bombing of North Vietnam, right after his installation into power following the election, there has not been a second in which we have any evidence of hesitation in carrying forth the war. Every day, every week, every month the war grows, and approaches fulfillment of the militarist and cold warrior's dream. Some defenders of Johnson maintain the military doesn't get what it wants. How could it get what it wants? If it were given exactly what it desired all at once national and world opinion would be so outraged as to defeat its purpose. But let the world be fed the pollution and poison of the war in slow stages, and it becomes palatable. Not at once, but step by step, the military gets what it wants. The pattern is all too terrifyingly clear to be denied or ascribed to chance. What the military wants, it gets.

At one time bombing of the North was unthinkable. The military wanted it, and got it.

February 24th, 1965 jets were used for the first time in air strikes. On March 2nd there were conducted the first explicitly non-realiatory raids. On April 7th, in response to mounting concern over the war, Johnson gave the world words of peace, and within four months of that there was a movement of 100,000 men to Vietnam. And during this period of deliberate, systematic escalation, any overture or sign from the other side was ignored or deflected by Rusk's militarily insulated antennae or by the President or others in the administration.

Then we heard of La Pira's conversation with Ho Chi Minh. It took place on November 11th of 1967. Of course, jubilant over a prospect of peace, Rusk's responses to the November 11 conversation came on December 4th. Then came the real response, for on December 15th Haiphong was bombed for the first time. And during our greatly propagandized bombing halt we kept the escalation mounting. We put in over 14,000 men during the 37 day bombing pause, and on January 27th we launched "Operation Masher," the largest amphibious operation by the United States Marines since the 1950 Inchon landing in Korea. And what is significant, considering the pattern of action where there should have been none is that this operation did not come in response to a new attack by the enemy, but in response to a lull.

On June 25, 1966 Chester Renning, eminent Canadian diplomat, was reported to have returned from Hanoi with significant information on Canadian efforts to commence peace talks. Also, Secretary McNamara had informed Senate Armed Services Committee that industries of the North contribute little to supplies used in the South. Yet, at the end of June, with no external basis for such action, we commenced to bomb Hanoi-Haiphong area.

Now it can be shown that a pattern of bombing away any opportunity for peace has been the consistent policy of the Johnson government ever since the great overtures for peace in the summer of 1964 when Johnson first ordered a bombing of the North. The bombing of the North grew out of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Ostensibly this incident involved an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the U.S. destroyers, Maddox and Turner Joy. The question of whether such attacks occurred at all still rages:

Washington, Feb. 21 (UPI).--Sen. J. William Fullbright (D., Ark.) charged Wednesday- and the Defense Department denied- that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara had suppressed information strongly suggesting U.S. destroyers were not attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin incident. (The Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 22, 1968.)

Here again we see action where no action may have been called for. To consider action where there should be none expected, it is an interesting commentary upon the ability of our government to be moved into action, when we consider Oswald was wanted before we can show he was legitimately identified, and the military assured us of no conspiracy before the lone assassin was even charged with killing the President. We know now that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was drafted by Bundy before the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

The Unpolitical Johnson- A Military Idealist

Why did President Johnson not take advantage of opportunities for peace talks on Vietnam? He would not have lost face. On the

contrary, regarding him as the vain, egotistical politician that he is, he would have reaped gigantic political rewards, on the assumption we are a democracy. The following headlines which are but a brief sample, reveal this:

"War Could 'Bury' Democrats: Galbraith" - (New York Post, April, 3, 1967.)

"Poll Calls Vietnam Johnson's Liability" - (New York Times, June 20, 1967.)

"President Hurt by Viet War" - (New York Times, March 12, 1967.)

"Johnson Defeat in 1968 Feared by Democrats -

...War Stalemate Blamed" - (The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 6, 1967.)

And Carl Rowan asserted:

"...simple logic says the President cannot possibly gain from having the war drag on, so he has got to want peace in Vietnam almost as much as he wants to go on living..." (The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, December 7, 1966.)

Yet, the record clearly indicates opportunities for peace have not been reacted to, and that does raise the question of why not? In the past, in situations where we got into trouble - in Lebanon, Quemoy and Matsu, or Berlin, for example - and we seemed close to war - the Chief Executive would back off. But there has not been the slightest backing off in the post Kennedy Vietnam situation, not even in response to popular demand. At first the President enshrined the ideal of consensus, but was unmoved when he was acting without consensus. Now the President has apparently been reduced by Vietnam from a powerful consensus President to a military errand boy.

We cannot explain this war on the aims or dynamic of a democratic society, but it makes perfect sense in terms of a garrison state--a military society. What we who awaken in this dangerous situation must ask is when did the military gain control? If it makes most sense to explain our action in Vietnam in military categories, and the very inevitability of the escalation certainly makes it seem that we must so explain it, when did the military come into power? They weren't there in that utterly dominant sense before the assassination, and they were after.

In trying to explain the Vietnam war we are led back to the assassination. Of course, perhaps it is only coincidence. One really hopes so, but there has been so much left to an explanation in terms of coincidence since the assassination. In rejecting the idea this is a universe of chance, Einstein once said he did not believe God would play dice with the universe. In the case of the assassination and the war it doesn't seem God is playing dice either--it seems the military have loaded the dice. Mankind had better beware. They are exploding dice.

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CONSPIRACY TO KILL JFK - ITS MEANING

THE CONSPIRACY TO KILL J.F.K.-ITS MEANING

This article is designed to explore the meaning of the Kennedy assassination. We examine preliminarily the Federal government's over reaction to the concept of Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin even before evidence developed in support of this official thesis. Also, we trace the Federal government's consistent refusal to entertain conspiracy evidence. We demonstrate how the Federal authorities remained married to an untenable single assassin theory, although conspiracy evidence poured into them immediately after the assassination.

Dallas police behavior, in terms of initially gathering evidence in support of conspiracy, and only later conforming to the federally originated concept of Oswald as the lone assassin, we deal with only briefly. Let it suffice to say that the Dallas police behavior has been documented in other critical assassination studies. For the present we merely assert that the Dallas police behaved in a manner consistent with initial innocence of the major body of police in the killing of President Kennedy. The very inconsistency of the Dallas police, as counterposed to the deadly consistency of the federal authorities, supports initial innocence of the major part of the Dallas police force.

The latter portion of this article states a model of explanation for the assassination. The model explains the assassination in terms of motivation. We conclude that the evidence supports the concept that the assassination was used to militarize foreign policy and perpetuate the Cold War against the underdeveloped peoples.

The Warren Report- Myth Generation

To take seriously Warren Commission conclusions concerning physical evidence relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy one need only refuse to take seriously Newtonian laws of the physical universe. We are told by the Warren Commission that the fatal shot which struck Kennedy's skull came from the School Depository Building, or from in back of him. Yet, Kennedy was not driven forward by this bullet smashing him from behind. In defiance of laws of physics, he instead was driven to the side, leftward, and backward, and was slammed off the back seat of the Presidential limousine into his wife's arms. Such propulsion of the Kennedy body and head was consistent only with a shot aimed from the right and in front of him.

The Commission's straining of logic and its blatant evasion of evidence in order to support a lone assassin theory represents consistent official behavior from the very onset. Indeed, if certain Commission conclusions were in violation of Newtonian laws of physics, a variation on the theme of those laws governing behavioral patterns of officials may be clearly detected.

Wherever evidence of a conspiracy with respect to the assassination has surfaced, the federal government, from the very first, refused to act. Wherever any suggestion of evidence supported the concept of Oswald as the assassin, the Federal government overreacted in deeming such data veracious. Analysis of this pattern of official inaction and over reaction leads one to a compelling conclusion of official guilt. The pattern is too studied, too consistent and too persistent to be compatible with mere bureaucratic stupidity or accident. If the assassination had been a script for the Theater of the Absurd, perhaps it could be understood, but it was reality- a tragic reality.

Amid the shock, grief and horror of the first reactions to Kennedy's brutal murder a question which had to weigh heavy upon us all concerned who killed him, and why. An amazingly quick solution was in the possession of the military- too quick! If one wishes to see lightning quick action where in fact no action is justified, the scene is Air Force One en route from Dallas to Washington.

Pulitzer prize winner, Theodore H. White, in his book, The Making of the President 1964,¹ has recorded the making of history for us, and in so doing makes us raise some crucially important questions. He informs us:

"There is a tape-recording in the archives of the government which best recaptures the sound of the horrors as it waited for leadership. It is a recording of all the conversations in the air, monitored by the Signal Corps Midwestern center "Liberty," between Air Force One in Dallas, the Cabinet plane over the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs Communications center in Washington. The voices were superbly flat, calm, controlled...one receives the ETA- 6:00 P.M. Washington. It is a meshing of emotionless voices in the air, performing with mechanical perfection..." (p.20)

Later, we are further illuminated by White with the following statement:

"On the flight the party learned that there was no conspiracy, learned of the identity of Oswald and his arrest; and the President's mind turned to the duties of consoling the stricken and guiding the quick." (p.48)

On the contrary, it would seem the quick were guiding the President. "Flat, calm, controlled, emotionless voices" knowing before six o'clock on November 22, 1963 there was no conspiracy! That's a bit too much. Are we to believe it was already known Oswald was the lone assassin? If so, that would surely have been an impressive understanding of what happened since Oswald was not even charged with assassinating the President until

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1. White, Theodore H., The Making of the President, 1964, p. 20. New York, Atheneum, 1965.

1:30 A.M. the next morning. Indeed, at a press conference held at midnight on the 22nd, Oswald upon being asked if he had killed the president, responded that he had not even been charged with that.¹

On November 23, 1963, the Dallas Morning News informed us that according to Henry Wade: "...preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved in the shooting...the electric chair is too good for the killers." If preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved, how could the military have been so certain so early there had been no conspiracy? In volume one of the 26 volumes of Hearings and Exhibits, Mrs. Oswald is quoted as asserting: "So we waited quite a while. One of the men came by and said, 'I am sorry that we are going to be delayed in letting you see Lee, but we have picked up another suspect.'"² This was on Saturday at noon!!

Can there be any doubt that for any taken by surprise by the assassination, and legitimately seeking the truth concerning this, sometime prior to six o'clock on the day of the assassination was too soon to know there was no conspiracy. Unless White is wrong in what he relates to us concerning this, and he failed to acknowledge error in a note to Salandria, the notification of "no conspiracy" assumes a major importance, coming as early as it did. What is startling about this tape is that it represents the first memorialization of the lone assassin myth. This premature birth of the Oswald myth came sans benefit of sufficient gestation period to have been the product of any legitimate intercourse between the American military (the author's of the tape and apparently of the myth) and the assassination evidence. Its importance caused Salandria to expend much effort in trying to procure

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1. Lane, Mark, Rush to Judgment, p. 81, Conn: Fawcett Publications Inc., 1966.
2. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Vol. 1, p. 149. United States Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1964. References to the Hearing Notes and the Commission Exhibits are designated by the volume number, an "H," followed by a page number.

the transcript.

The Search for the Crucial Tape

Dr. Robert H. Bahmer, Archivist of the United States, wrote to Salandria on November 20, 1967 that Mr. T. H. White was wrong in his contention that there is a tape in the Archives which contains the contents of the communication between Air Force One and the White House Situation Room. Dr. Bahmer advised:

"We have no knowledge of the existence or location of the tape recording mentioned by Mr. White, despite having made some efforts since the receipt of your letter to obtain some information about it."

At this point Salandria switched his appeal to Mr. Pierre Salinger. In Mr. Salinger's book, With Kennedy,¹ he made mention of radio communication with the White House and the cabinet plane over the Pacific on November 22, 1963. Mr. Salinger's voice is recorded on the tape menticed by T.H. White. So it is clear that the tape was a recording of a three-way conversation among the White House Situation Room through the voice of Major Harold R. Patterson, the Presidential plane, Air Force One (returning to Washington from Dallas), and the Cabinet plane over the Pacific.

Salandria pointed out to Mr. Salinger the significance of the Pentagon announcement that Oswald was the lone assassin:

"If such was said, before there was any evidence against Oswald as the assassin, and while there was overwhelming evidence of a conspiracy, then the White House is in the interesting position of being the first to designate Oswald as the assassin and the first to have ruled out in the face of impressive evidence to the contrary, that there could have been a conspiracy." (letter from Salandria to Mr. Pierre Salinger, December 3, 1967.)

Salandria concluded a plea to Salinger for the tape with:

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1. Salinger, Pierre, With Kennedy, pp. 22-25. New York: Avon Books, 1967.

"Will you render this service to civilian rule and democracy for which President Kennedy gave his life?"

Pierre Salinger was quite willing to render such a service:

"Since the tape with which I worked was provided by the White House Communication Agency, it would seem to me that the tape of the conversation to which you refer would emanate from the same source, if such a tape, in fact, exists.

"As to the conversation with the cabinet plane, the transcript of that conversation is in my personal files which have been turned over to the National Archives for placement in the Kennedy Library.

"I certainly have no objection to your seeing that transcript, although the National Archives will undoubtedly write and ask my permission since it is included in my personal papers." (letter of December 26, 1967 from Mr. Pierre Salinger to Vincent J. Salandria)

But apparently what the White House Communication Agency giveth, the said branch of the Pentagon may taketh away. Dr. Bahmer answered Salandria's next request for the tape in a letter dated January 9, 1968:

"After receipt of your letter of December 28, a careful examination was made of the papers that Mr. Salinger has sent to us for storage. We have not, however, been able to find anything in the nature of a transcript of the tape recording that you are searching for.

"I regret that our reply to your inquiries, therefore, must still be in the negative. There is nothing that we are able to add to my earlier letter to you on this subject."

In his letter of January 2, 1968, to Salandria, Colonel U.S. Air Force, Armed Forces Aide to the President, James U. Cross was succinct in his refusal to cooperate in the search for the tape:

"I have been asked to respond to your letter, addressed to the White House Communication Agency, concerning a tape recording to Air Force One, November 22, 1963.

"Logs and tapes of the radio transmissions of military aircraft, including those of Air Force One, are kept for official use only. These tapes are not releasable, nor are they obtainable from commercial sources."

"I am sorry my response cannot be more favorable."

And so was Salandria. But Colonel Cross should know that Mr. T. H. White had access to the tape and his was not an "official use." Mr. Salinger had access to the transcript of the tape, and the use to which he put it was not "official."

Salandria was tempted to inquire of Colonel Cross whether he happened to know who removed Mr. Salinger's tape from his "personal files" while they were in the custody of the "National Archives for placement in the Kennedy Library." Salandria was tempted to ask how a transcript which was turned over to a journalist could attain, on an ex post facto basis, classified status and thereafter be restricted to official use only. But Salandria lost interest in pressing any further for the tape, because he strongly suspected that further pressure on the Pentagon would give birth to another governmental forgery in a case which is already over-burdened with governmental fabrication. Any tape produced at this late date after the shenanigans outlined above will perforce be as forged as the X-Rays and photographs of the Kennedy autopsy will be if and when they are ever produced.

The search for the tape did come full circle however with the following charming letter:

"In order to reply to your letter of last December 26, we sent a number of inquiries to various government agencies which has resulted in this very tardy reply

"To begin with, a search of our collections in the Library of Congress has not revealed any such recording.. Normally we would expect such recordings to go to the National Archives, and since it relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, to the Office of Presidential Libraries in that agency, where material for the Kennedy Library is being assembled. As I understand you have already learned from your earlier inquiry to the National Archives, no such recording has been located there. Our further inquiries with the Department of Defense have also failed to turn up any evidence of the recording, but we were advised to request that you write to the Department of the Army, Chief of Communications and Electronics, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. Perhaps that office can be of some assistance" (Letter from The Library of Congress, Donald L. Leavitt, Head, Recorded Sound Section to Vincent J. Salandria, dated February 20, 1968.)

"Perhaps that office can be of some assistance." Mr. Leavitt, we doubt it.

In summary, the report of this tape provided by Mr. Theodore H. White indicates that the Federal governmental apparatus had jumped the gun right after the guns of Dallas had completed their deadly work in dispatching a President from this world. The Pentagon had overly reacted to Oswald as the assassin and prematurely began the federal government's unvarying pattern of refusing to react to evidence of conspiracy.

If the problem of a tape informing us of a conspiracy at too early a moment in the history of the investigation were an isolated incident, we should be less confident in our suspicions, but it is no more than one element of a syndrome of behavior inappropriate to the challenges raised by the President's murder.

As we have said, it is always the case that officials are acting in the designation of Oswald as the assassin where the evidence does not warrant such a conclusion, and are failing to act by not investigating the evolving evidence pointing towards conspiracy. In the case of the tape there was an over action in the governmental officials' determination of no conspiracy. Such a finding was made by the federal government without any basis. Compare that with the inaction in the failure of the police officials to cut off transportation out of Dallas on the ominous day of the 22nd of November, 1963.

Mark Lane in his early lecture tour provided us with a most revealing story. A French journalist, desiring to provide an existential account of the efficiency of the FBI, decided to go to the airport at Dallas on the day of the assassination and attempt to fly back to France. He knew he would be questioned concerning why he was buying a ticket on the day of the assassination, and why he was trying to get out of the country. He was ready to sacrifice himself in order to get a first-hand account of how the

FBI would swing into action and deal with a man trying to get out of the country. It would probably be tough on him, but would make a good story. He got a good story all right. He bought his ticket; boarded the plane, and flew back to Paris with no interference. Transportation was not sealed off. The President of the United States had been murdered; the world leader had been shot down in the streets, and Oswald had not yet been established as a lone assassin, and transportation routes weren't blocked off!

Early Evidence of Conspiracy Abounds:

Now there has been much argument concerning the facts of the assassination. What is more significant than entering such argument at this late date is observation that at the time of the assassination and shortly thereafter what officials knew or had excellent reason to know was not what they acted on. Thus, in keeping with the pattern we have sought to establish as existing in official behavior, it can be shown there should have been specific action where conspiracy was indicated. Instead, there was inaction. Considerable early evidence which accumulated pointed to conspiracy. It is irrelevant whether subsequent discovery resolved errors in the original understanding of what transpired on that black Friday. All that is relevant is that there was more than sufficient evidence of conspiracy to require of an innocent federal government definite reaction. This is true with respect to eyewitness testimony, physical and medical evidence, and the facts surrounding the character and background of Oswald.

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Mark Lane demonstrated in Rush to Judgment that nearly 60 persons believed the shots that were fired at President Kennedy came from the grassy knoll. By now material concerning eyewitness accounts inconsistent with the assumption of a lone assassin lodged in the Texas School Book Depository, is well known. There is no need to labor this evidence here.

What is relevant here is to assess such testimony in the light of this pattern of action/inaction which seems to prevail in all official behavior.

Let us assume, for example, that the eyewitness testimony fails to stand up to critical analysis of the evidence as it is subsequently analysed (which we believe is in fact contrary to the case), but assume it anyhow. Further, let us assume any eyewitness testimony to be of limited value in determining what has happened in any given problematic situation. Considering all that, nonetheless, at the time this testimony would have had to suffice as a guide to official action until something better came along.

Let us now undertake to examine this early evidence which pointed towards a conspiracy. Immediately after the shooting, Sheriff Bill Decker ordered:

"Get over to the area where the shooting occurred and saturate the area of the park, railroad; and all buildings."
(XIX H 458)

Jesse E. Curry, Chief of Police, driving the lead car issued the order:

"Get a man on top of that triple underpass to see what happened up there."
(XVII H 467)

The weight of authority and eyewitness reaction establishes the shots as coming not from the School Book Depository, but the grassy knoll. Needless to say, shots from both places were not mutually exclusive concepts except by the logic of the Warren Commission. Now, disputation over the subsequent reactions could later be demonstrated to be erroneous. Again, the nagging question arises as to why at that time, in the light of such evidence, authorities did not overturn the whole area to discover if any person or persons might have consummated the crime from sites in addition to or other than the Depository.

Building. In a crime of such gravity, where there is official innocence, no stones would be left unturned. In fact, what was unturned in the form of stones which marked a conspiracy were so numerous that they resembled glacial deposits. Let us continue to pick our way through those deposits of first-day conspiratorial stones which juttied up all over Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, for the truth is concealed under them.

Numerous law enforcement officers and spectators immediately after the shots were fired ran toward the railroad yards in pursuit of suspected assassins. (VI H 288, II H 181) The films of Dealey Plaza immediately after the shots had been fired dramatically illustrate the rush of persons to the grassy knoll area. Within minutes of the assassination an estimated 50 policemen were searching the parking lot and railroad yards. (VI H. 288, II H 181)

Policeman Billy Hargis left the motorcade and raced up the grassy knoll to the apparent source of the shots. (V H 295) Sam Holland, a spectator, fearlessly raced into the parking lot which sits atop the grassy knoll from the railroad overpass. (VI H 243-246) Seymour Weitzman not only raced to the area of the knoll, but later located a piece of the President's skull on the South side of Elm Street and then found a rifle on the 6th floor of the Depository Building. (VII H 107)

One report was that a man and woman had been seen scrambling away across the grassy knoll. (Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 22, p. 1) A man with a "headpiece" in his hand had been seen running away from another spot in the knoll area. (XIX H, 492, XXIV H 222) The first people to reach the parking lot, where most of the spectators thought the shots originated from, found numerous footprints in the mud behind a picket fence. (VI H 245-246, XXII H 833) Two men with rifles had also been seen on the 6th floor of the Texas School Book Depository Bldg. (XXIV H 522) Ten minutes after the assassination a suspect raced from the Depository, signaled a car, jumped

into the car on the run, and was driven away. (VI H 266-267)

The Wounds Cry Out Conspiracy

Of course the wounds inflicted on persons in Dealey Plaza did not inspire confidence in a lone-assassin killing. The President had been hit in the back at a point which caused Secret Service Agent Glen A. Bennett, who was stationed in the Presidential follow-up car to say that he saw a shot "hit the President about four inches down from the right shoulder."¹ The President was further wounded in the anterior neck. Much of his head was shattered and great avulsive wounds had resulted when pieces of skull were driven out of his skull. Governor Connally suffered a wound in the back, right chest, right wrist and left femur. A bystander, a third man, James T. Tague, was wounded in Dealey Plaza. (W-116) Such carnage, added to damage to the Presidential limousine apparently resulting from the shooting, underscores the ominous and precipitous nature of the Pentagon's conclusion the very afternoon of the assassination that there was no conspiracy.

Let us for the moment consider the tiny neck wound in the front of the President and what should have been the natural action of an innocent government to that wound. The Commission made reference to the televised statement of Dr. Malcolm O. Perry with reference to the throat wound:

"Immediately after the assassination, many people reached erroneous conclusions about the source of the shots because of Dr. Perry's observations to the press...Dr. Perry stated merely that it was 'possible' that the neck wound was a wound of entrance." (W-90,91)

New York Times

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1. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, p. 111, United States Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1964. References to this Report are hereafter designated by "W" followed by a page number.

The New York Times of November 23, 1963 stated:

"...Dr. Malcolm Perry...gave...details...
Mr. Kennedy was hit by a bullet in the throat...
This wound had the appearance of a bullet's entry."

Let us give the Commission the benefit of all doubts and assume that it was right and The New York Times was wrong and misquoted Dr. Perry. Suppose, therefore, that Dr. Perry merely said, as the Commission contended he had, that it was "possible that the neck wound was a wound of entrance." Remember, that at the time Dr. Perry said that, the federal government had no evidence with which to contravene Dr. Perry's assessment of the neck wound as "possibly" one of entry. The dead President's body was in a cask heading for or on the Presidential plane in preparation for being flown back to Washington for the pomp of an unprecedented military funeral. We know now, and the federal government had every reason to know then, that the Presidential limousine was photographed proceeding away from the Texas Book Depository Building when it was first fired upon.

On the basis of Dr. Perry's statement of a "possible" entry wound in the front of the President, and because at the time of the inception of the firing, and at all times during the firing, the President had not faced the officially-designated assassin who was in the rear of the President, an innocent government would be under obligation to act on this information. Certainly we should have anticipated that the Mexican border would have been shut off by the U.S. authorities. Transportation terminals would have been saturated with police officials in an effort to cut off the escape of the assassin or assassins who "possibly" were positioned in the front of the President. We must bear in mind that the government did not have at this time the august and now largely discredited Warren Commission Report to hide

behind. The job of the federal authorities flush up against the assassination proper was to explore every "possibility" of apprehending any "possible" assassins. We are compelled to conclude that it was a guilty government that saw fit to rely upon the Warren Commission conclusions of a single assassin positioned in the rear of the President at a point where it had every reason to suspect that at least one assassin had fired from the front of the President.

Conspiracy was Implicit in the Press Accounts of November 22, 1963

While the Pentagon was informing the President that there was no conspiracy, based on the above-described wounds, the American press was outlining a conspiracy which was very different from the Pentagon version of the assassination.

Dallas (UPI), November 22, 1963, page 1 of The Billings Gazette, of Billings, Montana carried this report:

"Some of the Secret Service agents thought the gunfire was from an automatic weapon first... probably from the grassy knoll to which motorcycle policemen directed their attention as they raced up the slope."

The Lowell Sun, Lowell Massachusetts, November 22, 1963 carried on its first page the UPI account that:

"It was impossible to tell at once where Kennedy was hit, but bullet wounds in Connally's chest were plainly visible, indicating the gunfire might possibly have come from an automatic weapon."

The front page of the Illinois State Register of the same date carried the UPI report:

"Newsmen some five car lengths behind the President heard what sounded like three bursts of gunfire."

The Berkshire Eagle, of Pittsfield, Massachusetts on the assassination day carried a front-page refutation of a cut-and-dry-one-assassin theory which refutation should have given pause to the Pentagon's immediate conclusion that one assassin had performed the bloody work at Dealey Plaza:

"Three gunbursts of fire, apparently from automatic weapons, were heard."

Perhaps no automatic weapon or weapons were used. Perhaps there was no firing from the grassy knoll. Perhaps the Connally wounds did not prove conspiracy. Perhaps the later drying cleaning and pressing of the Connally clothing prior to submission to the F.B.I. was just ^afunction of idiotic innocence on the part of the government. Perhaps there were just three shots and not bursts of gun fire. But, the press accounts of the wounds, their complexity and number, and the initial accounts of automatic weapons firing from other than the Texas Book Depository provide a grim background for the Pentagon's reassurances to the President and the cabinet that one man positioned behind the President.

Back in Dealey Plaza the Evidence Spells out Conspiracy

Not only did the shots seem to emanate from the grassy knoll area by virtue of the auditory clues, but puffs of smoke were reported as seen in the area of the knoll at the time of the firing.¹ In addition to puffs of smoke being seen in the grassy knoll locale, gunpowder was smelled in the same area. Such evidence,

at least, at the time, should have aroused suspicions of a conspiracy, and should have caused the most intensive manhunt, rather than satisfaction with a single assassin concept.

Surely, eye or ear-witness testimony can never constitute the most solid foundation for reconstruction of an event. And although the majority of witnesses did not testify as to hearing more than three shots, still this was the murder of the President, and eyewitness testimony should have roused questions about the direction and number of shots. The result of those unanswered questions should have been to have set in action a search for a person or persons other than Oswald who may have been involved alone or in conjunction with him. Instead of action directed at discovering what happened, there was federal action directed at entertaining only the evidence consistent with a long-assassin theory.

In addition to testimony concerning direction and number of shots, that evidence concerning "bunching" of shots should have sufficed to shock officials into action. An amateur photographer, Abraham Zapruder, took a film of the assassination, and based upon it, the time of the assassination has been established as taking place between 4.8 seconds and 5.6 seconds. The Zapruder motion picture camera operates at an average speed of 18.2 frames per second. The very shortest time one can work that bolt-action rifle alleged to have been used by Oswald is 2.3 seconds. That 2.3 seconds is equivalent to about 42 frames of the Zapruder film. If there were only one assassin, it therefore mathematically follows, between each shot there must have been a minimum of 42

of 42 frames. If one shot were fired and then another in a shorter interval than 42 frames, that would add up to two assassins. For there to have been but one assassin there would have had to been an even spacing of the shots with a minimum of 42 frames between each shot. As a matter of fact, the Warren Report informs us, a majority of the witnesses stated the shots were not evenly fired, but that the second and third shots were "bunched" together. Indeed, even Secret Service agent Roy H. Kellerman testified that shots were "bunched." He was in the President's car and stated "...a flurry of shells came into the car..." Kellerman described these shots as so bunched as to be like "a plane breaking the sound barrier, bang, bang." (II H 74 & 76) With the unfortunately slow weapon of Oswald's in their possession, and testimony concerning "bunching," immediate action should have ensued aimed at finding two or more assassins and other weapons. What the government was really saying was that, irrespective of what its honest agents such as Roy H. Kellerman concluded, there was to be one assassin and he was to be Oswald.

No Governmental Response to the Unwanted Conspiracy Evidence

Still, evidence of more than one assassin having been involved in the assassination continued to pour into the Dallas police authorities. Whether two assassins or many, it seemed clear that the escape had been well planned. Local police agencies and the F.B.I. normally respond to bank robberies and other crimes by setting up road blocks and by mobilizing dragnets. But, in this case, which involved the assassination of a President and the wounding

of a governor, no action of any sort was taken to seal off any part of Dallas or the entire city itself. Bus terminals, airports and trains were not watched. Private planes were not grounded. Roadblocks were not set up. The city was not swarming with local and federal investigators. Not only was the attack on the President not treated as an act directed against the government of the U.S., it was not even treated as important a crime as the robbing of a bank. Such neglect on the part of the federal police agencies constituted nothing short of malfeasance. The question arises- how can one assassin induce those in command of federal police agencies to commit malfeasance of such incredible proportions? An argument might be made for the innocence of the Dallas police on the bases of paralysis and gross incompetence, shock, confusion and the fact that they were besieged by both press and public, but the failure of federal agencies remains suspect of being criminal in nature.

The widespread confusion and panic following the Lincoln assassination did not prevent the mobilization of the full resources of the federal government to seal off the city of Washington and to begin a massive investigation. But the almost complete failure of federal intelligence agencies following the Kennedy assassination occurred in a circumstance lacking in widespread hysteria. Their malfeasance was represented in their failure to follow up on any and all leads thrusting in the direction of conspiracy. There is no evidence to support the proposition that federal government agents had been thrown into a panic which might possibly have provided a weak rationale for their initial inaction. There is, on the contrary, substantial evidence of government response, but never to evidence of conspiracy.

An unidentified CIA agent showed up at the Parkland Hospital shortly after the assassination. (XVIII H 795) F.B.I. agents who interviewed Lee Harvey Oswald after his arrest were apparently calm enough to carefully avoid asking any key questions or dropping any hints to the accused that he was a suspect in the Kennedy assassination.

The failure of police agencies to seal off the city of Dallas was soon confounded by another seemingly inexplicable failure. Once the assassins had escaped from the scene, it would seem reasonable, in the absence of clues to their identity, that they would be searched for among J.F.K.'s self-proclaimed enemies in Dallas. If federal agencies were unsure of where to begin, they could have asked the man on the street. Less than a month before the assassination, Adlai Stevenson had been physically attacked and spat on by an angry Dallas mob. The morning of the assassination there was a black-bordered full page ad in the Dallas Morning News which attacked the President. (W-294) Handbills entitled "Wanted for Treason" bearing the President's profile were handed out on the streets one or two days before President Kennedy's arrival. (W-298) The author of this handbill was Robert A. Surrey, who is and was then closely associated with General Edwin Walker. (W-298) General Walker was flying the flag outside his house at half-staff and upside down- an international symbol of distress. Walker flew it properly after Kennedy's death had been announced. (UPI Dispatch, Dallas, Dec. 10, 1963)

Government Reaction to Oswald as Assassin- Reflexively Quick

Juxtaposed to the failure to provide any explanation for the extreme reluctance of the authorities to follow conspiratorial leads, there is also no satisfactory explanation of why there was such fast action in wanting Oswald. There was no general roll call in the Depository, and other employees than Oswald left the building. Thus, his behavior as a Depository employee did not seem to distinguish him in any way. The alleged eyewitness to the President's assassination, Howard L. Brennan, who was supposed to have seen Oswald do the shooting, is hardly a reliable witness. He failed to pick out Oswald in the police line up that day:

(III H 148) Further, if we assume Brennan to have been a creditable observe, the question remains concerning why after he informed the police, the assassin was in the Book Depository, police continued to concentrate on the knoll area, and why there was not immediate action to seal off the Depository.

Further, if there was such prompt action in responding to Brennan's description of Oswald as being on the sixth floor of the School Book Depository, the question arises concerning why there was such inaction until 1:22 P.M. that the rifle and shells were not found on the sixth floor until that time.

Similar problems with eyewitness testimony related to the killing of Officer Tippit fail to inspire confidence in official honesty. Helen L. Markam, an eyewitness to the Tippit murder, gave a description of the assassin which didn't fit Oswald. In addition to Mrs. Markam, the only other witnesses who actually

saw the shooting of Tippit were Domingo Benavides and Acquilla Clemons, and neither of them identified Oswald.

After his arrest, Oswald was taken to police headquarters for interrogation. When Chief of Homicide, Fritz, arrived at HQ's shortly after 2:00 P.M. and put out a pick-up order on Oswald, he was told that Oswald was already in custody. (W-9) The reason for the pick-up order was ostensibly that Oswald had been noticed as "missing" from the Depository after the assassination by Roy Truly, manager of the building. (W-9) Although Oswald was not the only man missing from the Depository, Chief of Homicide, Fritz, immediately felt "it was important to hold him." (IV h 206) Again for some unknown reason, Oswald seemed to be in the spotlight. Oswald was interrogated extensively for the remainder of the day by the Dallas police, Secret Service agents, and F.B.I. agents. No transcripts exist for these or any other sessions during which Oswald was questioned. According to the testimony and notes made by those who questioned Oswald, he was never once asked about either the Tippit murder or Kennedy assassination. At a midnight press conference on Friday night Oswald made the following remarks:

"I really don't know what the situation is about. Nobody had told me anything except that I am accused of, of murdering a policeman. I know nothing more than that and I do request someone to come forward to give me legal assistance." (W-200-201)

When asked if he had killed the President, Oswald replied:

"No, I have not been charged with that. In fact nobody has said that to me yet. The first thing I heard about it was when the newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that question." (W-201)

He told John Hart of CBS: "I'm just a Patsy."¹ This is incredible! Oswald was interrogated for about eight hours and apparently never asked about whether he killed the President.

Oswald was not the only suspect arrested that day. Richard Sprague, an independent investigator, has found photographic evidence of eight or nine persons under arrest following the assassination. Three were tramps arrested near the railroad tracks; two were Negroes, one was a Cuban, and one was arrested in Fort Worth. Only one, Larry Florer, has been identified, and he was not questioned by the Warren Commission. (R. Sprague, "The Kennedy Assassination," Oct. 15, 1967. Edition #4)

But there were others. Minutes after the shots an unarmed 31 year old man was arrested in the railroad yards adjacent to the parking lot. He was arrested and booked on charges of "investigation of conspiracy to commit murder." These charges weren't dropped until Dec. 2, eight days after Lee Harvey Oswald's murder. He was held for eight days during which the Dallas police and nationwide news media were claiming the case was closed and Oswald was the sole assassin. He was still being held on Dec. 8 on "city charges" and there is no way of knowing when, if ever, he was released (Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 8, 1963)

Just after the shots, patrolman W. E. Barber noticed workers on the 3rd floor of the Depository tapping on a window and pointing to a man wearing horn-rimmed glasses, a plaid jacket, and a raincoat. He was immediately arrested and taken to Sheriff Bill Decker's office for questioning. (Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 22, 1963)

At about 1:15 patrolman L. S. Debenport told the police radio dis-

¹ Jones, Penn, Forgive My Grief II, p. 11. The Midlothean Mirror, Inc., Texas, 1967.

patcher that he was "taking a prisoner to the downtown jail." (XXIII H 919) A short time later police brought a "disheveled- looking man" from the Depository. Jack Beers Jr., a photographer for the Dallas Morning News, snapped a picture of him. (XIII H 105) Chief Deputy Sheriff Allen Sweatt reported an arrest made about this time which may be a reference to the same incident. According to him, a police officer "brought a boy with a sport coat up and said, 'Here is the man that had done the shooting.'" Since the Warren Commission never made any inquiries about this arrest, there is no way of knowing why the police officer thought that he had apprehended the assassin. (XIX H 532)

Finally, when Oswald's mother and wife went to visit him in the Dallas Sheriff's Office, they were told that there would be a long delay because the police had "picked up another suspect." Whoever this man was, the police were quite interested in him. (I H 149) Perhaps the most interesting thing about these suspects is that most or possibly all of them were arrested at the scene of the crime. Oswald, of course, was not.

Physical evidence and eyewitness testimony were also pouring in. Three empty cartridge cases were found near the S. E. corner window on the sixth floor of the Depository Bldg., and a bolt action rifle with a telescopic sight was discovered in a different section of the same floor. Ownership of the rifle was not traced until about 2:00 A.M. the next morning. (W-79)

Eyewitness testimony indicated the following:

1. Shots had been fired from behind a picket fence which is on top of the grassy knoll to the west of the Dook Depository Bldg. In

addition to ear-witness testimony, several witnesses saw a puff of smoke in that area, and a police officer smelled gunsmoke. (VI H 243-245; XXIII H 833-836) Many footprints were found on the ground and strangers had been seen in the area prior to the assassination. (VI H 245-246; XXII H 833; VI H 287) Finally, a man with credentials, identifying him as a Secret Service man, was encountered by a policeman as he was escaping from the area just after the shots. (VII H 535)

2. Shots had been fired from the S.E. corner window from the 6th floor of the Book Depository Bldg. Three men had been seen on the floor prior to the shots, two of whom were armed with rifles. (II H 171, 175-176) Eyewitness testimony seemed to indicate that only one man had done any shooting.

3. A man was seen escaping from the area between the Depository and the picket fence who was thought to have a "headpiece" in his hands. (XIX H 492; XXIV H 222) Four unusual vehicles cruised in the area restricted to police cars behind the picket fence prior to the shooting, and at least one was driven by a man speaking into a microphone. (XXV H 853; VI H 285-286)

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4. A man was seen carrying a "guncase" up towards the picket fence more than an hour prior to the assassination while another man stayed in their truck which seemed to be stalled. (XIX H 983-84; XXIV H 216)

In conclusion, even if all of the preceding testimony was later judged to be incorrect in a court of law, on the day of the assassination it suggested in an overwhelming fashion a conspiracy to kill

✓ Kennedy. According to Henry Wade, the D. A. of Dallas, "...preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved in the shooting... the electric chair is too good for the killers." (Dallas Morning News, Nov. 23, 1963) There was reason to believe of course, that others might be involved as accessories before and after the fact. It should be added that, if Oswald was involved, there was immediate evidence of at least one accessory after the fact. The only convincing eyewitness identification of Oswald made that day was by a Deputy Sheriff, Roger D. Craig, who saw him leave the Depository ten minutes after the shooting and then identified him at police HQ's. (VI H 266 & 26) He stated that he saw Oswald run from the Depository and jump into a car driven by another man which sped away from the scene. Oswald, according to Craig, immediately admitted that he had full knowledge of the incident. (VI H 270; XIX H 524)

On that afternoon, the strongest evidence against Oswald was that he was inside the Depository when the shots were fired. Since he worked in the Depository, and there were also others in the building at the time of the assassination, this is poor evidence indeed. When asked where he was at the time of the shots, he replied that he was on the first floor eating his lunch. Since patrolman Marion Baker and Depository manager Roy Truly rushed up into the Depository immediately following the shots and found Oswald in the second floor lunchroom, there would appear to be no reason to question Oswald's claim. Baker testified he was calm and was not out of breath. (W-149, 152) Depository employees who were near the stairs or who ran down them were questioned, but none had seen or heard Oswald descending the stairs. (W-71; VI H 388; XXII H 632, 676)

Since the shots fired from the Depository appeared to have come from the sixth floor, Oswald seemed to have had an alibi.

By late in the afternoon of Nov. 22, 1963, the following was the state of affairs:

① John F. Kennedy was dead and his body had been illegally taken from Dallas ostensibly because of the concern for the protection of Jacqueline Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. But what possible excuse could be provided for the removal of his Presidential car which was damaged in the firing on the motorcade and constituted vital evidence in the anticipated trial of Oswald? Until proven otherwise, the Secret Service was duty-bound to assume that there was a conspiracy to kill Kennedy and other high officials.

② The available evidence overwhelmingly indicated that there had been a conspiracy to kill at least the President. There had apparently been enough gunmen strategically placed in Deally Plaza to have also killed Lyndon Johnson. There was no way of telling at the time whether the plans had been to kill Johnson also, which plans may have been frustrated by the fast action of Secret Service men who pushed him down in the seat and covered his body with theirs.

③ A number of suspects had been arrested. Of these suspects, we know only of Oswald, against whom at the time of the assassination there was no evidence for participation in the crime and who was not charged with the crime until 1:30 the next morning.

What is most disturbing about the investigation of the assassination is that it is seemed to proceed with the lone assassin thesis at the outset. If such is the case, then one is face with prim facie evi-

★ → dence of foreknowledge of the assassin's action on the part of those who guide our federal intelligence agencies. Again we must also raise questions about the conduct of the Dallas police, but their failure is nowhere near as disturbing as that of federal agencies.

Let us now examine some of the unusual facets of the investigation of the assassination of J. F. K.

Failure to Investigate Oswald's Associates

We have already pointed out that despite the arrest of a number of suspects at the scene of the crime, the investigation following the assassination focussed on Oswald. But forgetting for the moment the failure to interrogate the enemies of J.F.K. in Dallas and failure to seal off the city, there is another glaringly apparent failure. Given their assumption that Oswald was the assassin, it seems inexplicable that police agencies did not investigate persons who might have conspired with Oswald.

For instance, as has already been pointed out, Oswald was seen driving away from the Depository by another man. He is reported to have admitted the incident and then apparently went on to affirm that the car used belonged to Mrs. Ruth Paine. (XIX H 521) (It is worthy of note that the car has an identical description to one owned by Mrs. Paine.) But when the police arrived at the Paine house at almost 3:00 P.M., all they wanted to do was to search Oswald's things. (W-15) They did not seem alarmed when Mrs. Paine greeted them at the door saying that she was expecting them. Interestingly enough, Marina Oswald testified that Ruth Paine had told her shots had been fired at the President from the building where Lee worked. (I H 74; XXIV H 640) But Mrs. Paine testified before the

Commission that she thought Lee Oswald worked in the Book Depository Warehouse two blocks from the assassination scene. (III H 34-36) If Marina's testimony is accurate, Ruth Paine has some explaining to do. Ironically, Mary Suratt, who owned the tavern where John Wilkes Booth plotted Lincoln's assassination, became a suspect as an accomplice after having made a similar statement and run some errands for Booth. (Eisenchimal, Otto, Lincoln's Assassination, Illinois State Historical Journal; Vol. 43, Autumn 1950, pp. 204-220)

But Ruth Paine ran more than errands for Oswald. Oswald's wife stayed in the Paine house in Irving, Texas, and he went there on weekends. His rifle was allegedly stored in their garage. (W-15)

Ruth Paine drove Marina Oswald the 500 miles to New Orleans in May, 1963, and then transported Marina and all the Oswald's belongings back to Irving, Texas in September of the same year. (W-14) If we seem suspicious of Paine's generosity, it is because after the assassination, she failed to get Lee Harvey Oswald legal assistance which he had requested of her. Mrs. Paine not only failed to get a lawyer, but compounded this failure by neglecting to advise Oswald of her failure to obtain a lawyer, thus placing him in great peril and leaving him ignorant of this peril. (3 H 89)

Most interesting of all is the fact that Ruth Paine got Oswald his job at the Depository Building. It seems an incredible coincidence that she placed only one phone call to get Oswald a job, and that phone call was to the Book Depository. (W-14) Further, Mrs. Paine spoke Russian and had corresponded with persons living in the Soviet Union for a number of years. (W-285) This correspondence did not interfere with her husband's security clearance which is further discussed. It is astonishing that Ruth Paine was never treated with suspicion by either the Dallas police or the federal intelligence agencies.

Michael Paine, Mrs. Paine's husband, was not treated with sus-

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dition either, despite the fact that he had attended political meetings with Oswald (II H 408) Michael's father was one of the leading Trotskyists in the U.S., and Michael attended some of their meetings while in high school. (II H 289-290; XXIII H 501) Nevertheless, despite his family background, he managed to get security clearance for his work as a research engineer for Bell Helicopter Co. (W-286) One is left to wonder what his quid pro quo for his clearance was.

It might be noticed at this point that once the Dallas police and federal agents had decided Oswald was a leftist, it would have seemed reasonable to round up other leftists for questioning. But no such action was taken. Considering the political atmosphere in Dallas, this is more surprising than the failure to pick up right wingers following the assassination.

Other suspicious associates of the Oswald's were George De Mohrenschildt and his wife Jean. George De Mohrenschildt has been described as a "strong believer in the U.S. form of government but he holds the belief that some form of undemocratic government might be best for other peoples." (W-283) George's son-in-law, Gary C. Taylor, said that if Oswald had gotten any assistance in the assassination, he would guess it was from the De Mohrenschildts. The following represents an excerpt from the testimony of Gary C. Taylor: "Well, the only thing that occurred to me that- uh- and I guess it was from the beginning- that if there was any assistance or plotters in the assassination, that it was in my opinion, most probably the De Mohrenschildts." (IX H 100) The DeMohrenschildts saw the Oswalds frequently prior to the assassination and according to the Warren Report, "De Mohrenschildt was apparently the only

Russian speaking person living in Dallas for whom Oswald had appreciable respect, and this seems to have been true even though De Mohrenschildt helped Marina Oswald leave her husband..." (W-282) Even after the Oswald's broke off all relations with the Russian speaking community in Dallas, they continued to see the De Mohrenschildts. (W-401) De Mohrenschildt has traveled extensively, and in 1960 he and his wife made an eight month hike from the U.S. Mexico border to Panama. (W-283) According to the Warren Report: "By happenstance they were in Guatemala city at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion." (W-283) According to De Mohrenschildt, he prepared a lengthy film and complete written log of the trip, and made a report on it to the U.S. government. (IX H 216) Despite a seemingly thorough investigation of De Mohrenschildt who had aroused their suspicions, there is no record of the Warren Commission ever having examined any documents relating to the trip. After the Bay of Pigs the De Mohrenschildts went to Haiti and became involve in what the Warren Report refers to as a "government-oriented business venture." (W-283) While the Warren Commission assures us that the De Mohrenschildts were not disloyal or subversive (W-283-284); one must wonder whether they could have truthfully assured us that they were not in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency. In any event, one wonders why they were immune from investigation in the days following Oswald's capture.

Within a week of the assassination the F.B.I. was notified of some incredible evidence concerning conspiracy. A young Cuban woman, Sylvia Odio, who was active in the anti-Castro movement, claimed to have been visited by a Leon Oswald and two other men in September of 1963. Both she and her sister independently indenti-

fied Lee Harvey Oswald as being Leon Oswald upon seeing his picture on T.V. Mrs. Odio testified that she received a call from one of the men with Oswald the next day and that he told her that Leon Oswald was a former Marine and expert marksman, that he was "loco" and capable of anything, and that he felt that Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs. (XI H 369, 377-379) Despite its obvious importance the F.B.I. conducted a very slow and superficial investigation into the incident which was not even concluded when the Warren Report went to press. (W-374) This entire incident is still wide open for explanation leaving in its wake serious questions. The two most obvious questions are whether Oswald conspired with others to kill Kennedy and whether an attempt to frame Oswald for the crime had begun as early as Sept. 1963. Neither precludes the involvement of the federal government, and the entire incident points out the widespread suppression of evidence by federal agencies which took place following the assassination.

Physical and Medical Evidence

With respect to physical evidence providing a basis for a call to action in response to conspiracy in the killing of Kennedy is even more overwhelming and more conclusive than in the case of eyewitness testimony. Officials need only have viewed the Zapruder film to have seen the fatal shot to Kennedy came from in front of him, and not from behind, as is alleged by the Warren Commission. Nothing is more dramatic than the impact the scene has on one who

had been fed the party-line position that Kennedy was shot from the Depository only. Kennedy is hit in the head and is propelled to the left and rear. We have seen the copy of the film in the Archives several times and it always is amazing. Every researcher who sees it has the same reaction. The laws of physics leave no doubt on this point. If Kennedy was forced backwards, as he was; he was shot from the front; other things being equal as they were. James Altgens, A.P. photographer was on the south side of Elm Street or to the left of President Kennedy, and he said that particles of flesh flew in his direction, and that would imply the shot was from the right front of Kennedy. Another witness, Charles F. Brehan, saw skull flying to the left and rear. Also police officers, Martin and Hargis, driving motorcycles to the left and rear of the presidential limousine were splattered with blood and brain matter. Such debris from Kennedy had to have followed the course it did as a result of a shot from the front. Such physical evidence clearly implied an assassin or assassins other than Oswald, or in addition to him. Why no action to apprehend the assassins? Why has our country failed to act on the most basic evidence of a conspiracy? The Warren Report never addressed a single word to this problem.

Let us turn our attention again to the throat wound of President Kennedy. All of the doctors at Parkland Memorial Hospital diagnosed the wound in President Kennedy's neck as an entrance wound. It was known very soon after the assassination that the presidential limousine had passed the Book Depository and Oswald had to have been shooting from the rear he couldn't have hit President Kennedy in the front of the neck. Now if Kennedy had been hit in the front of the neck, Oswald, if involved as an assassin or not, could certainly not

have been the lone assassin. Whatever subsequent discovery might have been made to have justified the assumption of the "neck" wound of President Kennedy was in fact an exit wound, there was a point at which the neck wound was believed by federal police to have been an entrance wound. Why no action at that time to apprehend the assassins who may have shot the President in the front of the neck? Weeks later there were experiments by federal police designed to discover how the President could have been hit in the front from the back. It would have been more logical to have wondered who hit the President in the front from the front, and to have undertaken to look for such a person.

The F.B.I. report found the bullet that the Commission maintained entered Kennedy, exited through his neck and wounded Governor Connally actually never exited from Kennedy. We know the time of the assassination shots was such that if more than three bullets had been fired, there had to have been a minimum of two assassins firing. Assume the F.B.I. was mistaken in its conclusion about that bullet not exiting from Kennedy, the incriminating question concerns: why they failed to act on that mistake. To conclude there was a second assassin, all the F.B.I. had to know was how to count beyond three. For assuming competency in elementary arithmetic the F.B.I. was aware of a bullet in Kennedy that did not exit, at least one bullet in Connally, the fatal head wound bullet, the neck wound, and bullet, and another bullet or bullet fragment which struck first a curb and then nicked a bystander, James T. Tague. Ignoring evidence of damage to the Presidential limousine and other eyewitness evidence of misses, we have a minimum of five bullets. Five bullets means at least two assassins. It doesn't matter that the figures the F.B.I. were working with might have been wrong, the point is they were the figures. Those figures would have required the F.B.I. to be seeking a second assassin. What the F.B.I. was finally instructed were the facts of the case is irrelevant. If we are to suppose the F.B.I. didn't know the "real" autopsy, then we must

HIDING from
"CONSPIRACY"
(like an elephant hides
from a mouse)

also suppose that on the basis of what it understood to be the facts, the F.B.I. should have put two and three together and come up with two or more assassins.

Why, indeed, was there a natural immobilization on the question of two assassins? Why above all else did the idea of a conspiracy become unthinkable in the Cold War American where for the past twenty years a virtual paranoia concerning communist plotting, machinations, and conspiracy has prevailed? Why in this nation, which has lived in pathological fear of communism, and in which a climate of hysteria has enveloped us all concerning communist ambitions for world domination, was there not any consideration given to the possibility of a communist conspiracy? Is it possible to believe our militarists, our anti-communist politicians, and our communications media would have concealed evidence of a conspiracy to kill Kennedy had such a conspiracy been or had the slightest chance of being? Yet there was, as we have seen, evidence of a conspiracy, and it was not acted upon. Why not? What did this nation so deeply fear that led it to hide from the facts of a conspiracy? What caused our government to be immobilized when action was called for? Could it have been the concept of conspiracy would have led not in the direction of a communist plot, but rather in a direction which would have been even more shocking to our own nation? whatever is the case, where action was called for, none was taken.

In fact, there was very patent evidence of conspiracy. Take for example the fatal head hit which must have come from in front of Kennedy and not from behind him. The Zapruder film makes that clear. There were too many shots, too many bullets, fired too close together for one assassin. There was evidence of an entrance wound

which Oswald could not have caused from his position behind Kennedy. Ray Marcus, a fine researcher into the assassination, has shown there was a hit at frame 189 of the Zapruder film. At that frame the President's right hand is waving. There is, thereafter a sharp jerk, and the President grasps toward his throat. Already by frame 205 the President's hand is at his throat. If the President had been shot after frame 205, the bullet would have had to have gone through his hand. And before frame 205 an oak tree made a hit from the Book Depository virtually impossible for its foliage shielded the Presidential limousine from the view of any person situated on the sixth floor of the Depository Building. The analysis of Ray Marcus is a logical one, and accounts for the medical diagnosis at Parkland of an entrance wound. This evidence which supports an early wound in the President's anterior neck should have occurred to officials at least as hypothesis. Such evidence of an early frontal strike on the President should have been acted upon by the officials or at least should have added to the suspicion of the existence of more than one assassin. Arguments that there was no hit so early, even if correct, were never weighty enough, and ~~or~~ ^{are} even now not convincing. To have precluded some consideration of an earlier hit and a second assassin is indicative of official guilt.

None of the physical evidence would lead any serious investigation to the conclusion of a lone assassin, and, indeed, the only bit of such evidence linking Oswald at all to the actual assassination is, in addition to being inconclusive, highly suggestive of a frame up. Bullet 399, the one shot from Oswald's gun, was supposed to have caused a number of wounds in Kennedy and Connally, including the smashing of bones in Connally. Yet there was no blood and no tissue upon it.

Nor was there any evidence of any kind of fabric weave impressed in the metal. This bullet was intact and undeformed but for a slight flattening in its front. It was also discovered under the most unusual circumstances- not at the scene of the assassination but under the mat of a stretcher, finally determined by Commission fiat to be Connally's stretcher. This bullet could not have done the damage we are told it in fact did. Not only was it not mangled, as the test bullet shot through a cadaver wrist was, but it left more fragments in weight in Connally's wounds than it could possibly have lost, considering the heaviest weight of such a bullet.¹ Not since the theory of phlogistin with the idea of negative weight has man been asked to accept such nonsense. No official investigator who was honest could have accepted such a lie.

The overwhelming preponderance of the physical evidence just doesn't permit an inference of a lone assassin. When one says there was a conspiracy to kill Kennedy and to hide the reasons for the assassination from the public, defenders of the Commission retort "you have a big conspiracy" intending such as a reductio ad absurdum of the conspiracy thesis. Yet, on every level,

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1. Salandria, Vincent J., The Impossible Tasks of One Assassination Bullet, p. 15, "The Minority of One," March 1966.

of our federal bureaucracy there was no action where evidence called for it, and there was action to impute sole blame on Oswald where it was uncalled for.

Briefly let us review some of the most sinister of actions by the federal government's police agents respecting the evidence. Governor Connally's bullet-torn coat and shirt were ignored by the federal police for weeks, and when they were finally obtained, were dry cleaned and pressed. The dry cleaning and pressing served to obliterate vital evidence necessary for the determination of the direction and type of bullet or bullets which struck the Governor. There was the startling and incriminating action of the then Commander James J. Humes, the head of the Bethesda autopsy team, who took and burned the original autopsy notes. In a free society the Commission investigating the President's assassination was not permitted to see the X-rays and photographs which were taken of the President's body at Bethesda. Can there be any other assumption against this background of suppression that Humes burned the notes because they revealed Kennedy was shot in the front and the back and therefore his wounds were incompatible with an assassination by one man? What happened to Humes as a consequence of his sinister burning of the original autopsy notes? He was promoted from Commander to Captain. Another rational action! After admittedly burning relevant evidence in the crime of the century, a man receives a promotion from those in power!

In addition to the physical evidence already mentioned, there is photographic material, all of which raises serious questions about a conspiracy. Wesiberg has contributed a valuable book in

this material. An independent investigator, Richard E. Sprague, has also done a brilliant job of analysis. Montesana 2 and Willis 10 (photos) indicate presence and "discovery" of one and possibly two more rifles besides the one found on the sixth floor. Why was that discovery not the basis for action? The Mary A. Moorman photo shows a possible total of four men behind a concrete wall, the fence and cupola structure at the west end of the arcade. The Hughes film and the Dillard photo show the sixth floor Depository window from which Oswald allegedly did his shooting within seconds of the assassination, and there is neither Oswald nor anyone else at that window.

What we might call hard physical evidence, that relating to angles of entrance of wounds, of positions from which shots might have been fired, the physical reactions of Kennedy and Connally, the direction of flying skull matter which resulted from the fatal wound in the President's head, the medical testimony of Parkland doctors and photographic evidence all provided impressive evidence for the assumption of a conspiracy. Even if we would now regard such evidence as questionable, there was a time at which authorities had such material as their best evidence, and were therefore duty bound to but did not act upon it. If there existed evidence for a conspiracy, and dangerous criminals who assassinated the President of the United States were on the loose, then all of us would be in danger. Surely our government in not reacting to evidence of conspiracy could not have felt the assassins a threat or a danger. Why not?

It is particularly interesting that there was not a national turmoil when we consider Oswald's background and associations.

Oswald's Background and Associations

The official conclusions about Oswald are that he was a loner- an insignificant nobody. Yet it has never been established that Oswald was insane or psychologically deranged. The question of motive thus becomes crucial. There are in our society many loners, many estranged men and women, but they do not therefore kill the President. Even if the question of evidence did not establish a conspiracy, one would have to have been most concerned over the question of motive. Why did Oswald do it? If he was so unimportant a person, then had he done it, one could expect instead of insisting he was framed, he would have proclaimed to the world he himself did rid it of the President of the United States?

An immediate problem which arises involves us in the question of why Oswald, a man who renounced his citizenship, defected to the Soviet Union, asserted his intention of giving away radar secrets, and constituted par excellence by all standards of the F.B.I. and Secret Service a subversive, was not under surveillance, contrary to standard procedure, on the day of President Kennedy's motorcade through Dallas. A revealing Dallas Police Report, February 17, 1964 informs us that a Mrs. Teofil Meller saw Karl Marx's Capital at Oswald's house. Mr. Meller checked with the F.B.I. and was told Oswald "was all right." How could such a person have been "all right" to the F.B.I.? Must not inaction on the part of our government in response to "subversive" behavior of Oswald only make sense on the assumption

he was all right to our government- we was their man. Oswald always received preferential treatment- action in his favor that makes no sense whatever except on the assumption he was a government man.

Sylvia Meagher has provided a particularly valuable service in calling to our attention government inaction where there should have been action and vice versa. A "lookout card" is prepared by the State Department Passport Office in order to have adequate information in the event action should be taken to refuse a passport. When Oswald sought to renounce his citizenship at the end of October 1959 there were grounds for preparing a lookout card, but none was prepared. On two other occasions preparation of a lookout card was mandatory. One was when the Embassy lost contact with Oswald, and had no way of knowing whether he might have taken an allegiance to the Soviet Union. The second occasion was when money was advanced to Oswald by the State Department. In neither case, however, was action taken, and a lookout card was not ever prepared. Sylvia Meagher states:

"An article in the New York Times of October 20, 1963, charged that 'for the past 15 years, the (State) department has attempted to deny passports to many Americans on the ground that their travel might be embarrassing.' Yet four months before this charge was published, Oswald applied for a passport (on June 24, 1963) and it was issued to him without a murmur only 24 hours late!"

She continues:

"The radical deviation from orthodox practice where Oswald was involved cannot be dismissed as random, inadvertent, or innocent- it is too consistent and uniform, vertically and horizontally, to be attributed to recurrent clerical error. It is a pattern that makes sense only in the context of a secret arrangement which places Oswald outside of the scope of normal measures of attrition." ("Oswald and the State Department, The Minority of One, Oct. 1966, p. 24.)

There he is, Oswald, the loner! The insignificant being shown preferential treatment from the very highest places prior to the assassination. There he is, Oswald, the loner who defected with an F.B.I. informant number and a firuge for a salary of \$200.00 from that same agency. (V H 242) On January 22, 1964, Rankin was informed by Waggoner Carr, the Attorney General of Texas, that Oswald had been a paid F.B.I. informer. (V P 242) The Warren Commission undertook no independent investigation, no meaningful action to determine the veracity of this report. Is there no action, because they knew it was true? If Oswald was just a lonely nobody, why is it there are fifty-one documents classified to secret in the National Archives relating to Oswald and Ruby if both of these men are so unimportant? Why should there be action on the part of our government to suppress information about nobodies- unless they are really somebodies?

Why is it George De Mohrenschildt should have any reaction at all to Oswald? If all things were normal, as they are supposed to have been on the surface, there would be no two people less likely to have any kind of relationship than De Mohrenschildt and Oswald. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Commission Counsel, describes De Mohrenschildt for us as follows:

"...you are a man of very superior education and extremely wide experience and acquaintance here and in Europe, South America, West Indies- you have lived an extremely colorful life..."

De Mohrenschildt simply replies:

"Yes." (IX H 236)

On the next page of the testimony De Mohrenschildt describes Oswald:

"I never would believe that any government would be stupid enough to trust Lee with anything important."

Jenner asked:

"Give me the basis of your opinion."

De Mohrenschildt:

"Well, against, as I said, an unstable individual, mixed-up individual, uneducated individual, without background. What government would give him any confidential work? No government would." (IX H 237)

Why then the intimacy between this man of "superior education" (De Mohrenschildt) and this "unstable" and "mixed up" person (Oswald)? With respect to Oswald there should have been inaction on behalf of De Mohrenschildt. If Oswald seemed to be a nobody, De Mohrenschildt was surely a somebody. A former CIA agent, an acquaintance of Bill Turner (who is on the staff of and contributes articles to Ramparts and is a careful student of the assassination) told Turner the CIA would have assigned someone the task of befriending Oswald and keeping an eye on him. De Mohrenschildt could be that someone. There is no other reason why he should have shown such an interest in Oswald. De Mohrenschildt is a petroleum geologist, associates with the socially most prominent people, was suspected of being a Nazi agent during World War II, was connected with our State Department in 1957-1958 (XIX H 555), and during the forties was involved in Facts, Inc. with a partner Baron Maydell, who was accused of being a German spy and who was certainly pro Nazi.

De Mohrenschildt also went to Yugoslavia and Ghana as a geological consultant for our State Department. The Haitian government repaid him work in the form of sesal plantation. Why was this man described as one with "superior education" interested in Oswald? Why was De Mohrenschildt interested in Oswald? And finally, why was no one interested in De Mohrenschildt on the day of the assassination? The one point at which we should have expected action on the part of the government would have been in response to this subversive activities, but never is there action on the basis of those.

And why is it that this obscure, unimportant Oswald, seems to have a double leaving a false path for him? Professor Richard Popkin has carefully followed the activities of a second Oswald.¹ Who was the Leon Oswald who met Mrs. Odio, and whom she was informed spoke of killing the President? Who was the Oswald who drove a car at 70 miles an hour, when Lee Harvey Oswald couldn't drive? Who was the Oswald who informed the automobile salesman he would soon come into money, and who told another salesman he was planning to go to Russia? Who was the Oswald who made a public nuisance of himself at a shooting range? Who was the Oswald who had a telescopic sight put on his rifle? In all cases the Commission tells us it wasn't Lee Harvey Oswald. Then who was it? What was he doing? Why was he doing this? The point is ^{that} the actions of Oswald, of his associates, or doubles, are not consistent with an interpretation on the basis of coincidence.

Oswald was given the most preferential treatment. No unfavorable action was taken against him when such action was called for. This was all before the assassination. After the assassination unfavorable action was taken against him, where it was not called for. The physical and eyewitness of the officials themselves didn't justify an inference of guilt on behalf of Oswald. The paraffin test was not consistent with his having fired a rifle because there were no nitrate deposits on his cheek.

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1. Popkin, Richard H., The Second Oswald, New York. Avon Books, 1966.

The main witness against Oswald, Brennan, was unable to identify him in a line up, and Oswald did not confess to having committed any crimes. Rather, he said he was framed. That doesn't mean he was, but it was a charge nonetheless that could well have been considered. The government was obligated to consider the hypothesis of a frame, because the Secret Service had been given a tape by the Intelligence Division of the Miami Police Department several days after November 9, 1963 which tape described an actual plot uncovered in Miami to kill President Kennedy. The informant described how a patsy would be provided to throw the public off the real trail of the conspirators. ¹ But, the authorities ignored this Miami revelation in interpreting Oswald's possible role in the assassination. They ignored it although the bullet designated Commission Exhibit 399 tipped itself off as a plant flying into the case as it did without benefit of blood, tissue, weight loss or deformation.

Again we see the pattern. There was prejudicial action taken against Oswald after the assassination. This official action wasn't justified by the very data authorities were themselves presenting as evidence. Before the assassination, when there was a justification for action against Oswald, none was taken. This pattern is only consistent with a frame-up, and

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1. Jones, Jr., Penn, Loc. Cit., p. 47.

this frame-up must go up to the highest levels-those levels which prevent our knowing information concerning Oswald's relationship with the government. It certainly goes up to the Warren Commission, which refused to consider any evidence bearing unfavorably on a lone assassin theory.

Further, it is interesting that while Oswald was arrested without real evidence, and tenaciously clung to as the lone assassin, no such action was taken against others who may have been suspicious. Only action against Oswald, where it most probably was unjustified, but none against others where it might have been justified. As we have already observed, Richard Sprague has brought the fact to our attention that a number of arrests were made after the assassination. There is photographic evidence of this. What happened to these men? Why were they not regarded with more suspicion considering the fact there was sufficient suspicion to arrest them- at a time the military was informing the new leaders there was no conspiracy.

A most interesting figure is Igor Vaganov. I am not suggesting he is guilty of anything, but he was sufficiently suspicious for the F.B.I. to question him for two hours. He was an excellent shot; carried a gun; turned up in Dallas not long before the assassination; left shortly thereafter, ^{and} fit the description of one of the men Aquilla Clemons said she saw kill Officer Tippit. He had a red Thunderbird and, Domingo Benavides, one of the witnesses to Tippit's murder, saw a man in a "red Ford." Tippit was shot with a .38 caliber revolver, the same kind Vaganov had with him. Further, Vaganov's whereabouts during the killing of Tippit haven't been substantiated. And the evening before the assassination,

Anne Vaganov was hysterical, and she called her sister to tell her that her husband "Turk"- Igor Vaganov, was going to do "something horrible tomorrow." (Esquire, August, 1967, p. 122)

Now all of this is circumstantial, and we need come to no conclusion of guilt on Vaganov's part. That is irrelevant in any case. The point is that he was a most suspicious person, and one might have expected after the assassination of our President more interest in him. Why was there not further action taken against him at the time? Even though he may have been cleared subsequently, in a situation during which a desperate search was supposed to be in process for solution of the mystery of the President's assassination, one would have expected federal authorities to have been less generous with someone in Vaganov's predicament. Yet, Vaganov told Salandria in an interview that at about 3 P.M. of November 22, 1963 the F.B.I. agents left him after calling their Dallas headquarters and learning that "They got him." So early? Again, they knew before they could know who the assassin was, and that he was alone in his work.

One might also be curious concerning why there was not a greater interest in Mrs. Ruth Paine, a Quaker, who helped Oswald to get a job at the Book Depository and who was supposed to have carried his rifle into the Dallas area, and who played other vital roles which no conspiracy could have left to chance. We certainly do not advocate paranoia on behalf of police in investigation of crimes, but based on past action, we know the police have a suspicious mentality, and we cannot help but wonder what happened to this characteristic bent of mind here.

Finally, it should be observed, that on the Commission's construction of the kind of person Oswald was, his actions seem to make no sense. Indeed, where he has acted, one should have expected inaction. Why did Oswald, if he was a pro Marxist and leftist loner, go out of his way to associate with left-wing groups before killing the President? He had associations with the Communist Party, Fair Play for Cuba, Socialist Labor Party, American Civil Liberties Union, and a person (Michael Paine) with some associations with the Socialist Workers Party. His family also lived with a Quaker. If he had any sympathy toward the left, he was doing it no favor by openly associating himself with such groups, before murdering the President. Such action would have been incredible- the exact opposite would be expected. The only reasonable interpretation is that Oswald wittingly or unwittingly was setting up the left for some agency which had predesignated him as the lone patsy in the Kennedy killing.

Whereever we should expect action to solve the mystery of the President's murder, we find inaction. And where we should expect inaction, we find action. In noting this pattern, it is significant to keep in mind the fact that, according to the New York Times, November 27, 1963: "Dallas authorities announced that they were turning over all evidence to the Federal Bureau of Investigation." This means that there was a lack of action, where there should have been action to solve the assassination, and that this inaction was at the federal level. The federal authorities assumed a monopoly over the evidence.*

It must be emphasized that in rehashing evidence and facts pertaining to the assassination that have long been discussed by critics we are not judging such evidence, but only making what we regard to be the very important observation that such evidence should have been acted upon, even though it might subsequently have been proven baseless. This is important, for the clear implication is that in light of evidence of a conspiracy our authorities had no fear about the conspirators, and could feel safe while refraining from action directed at apprehending them. What is interesting and merits further exploration is that this pattern of action where it is uncalled for, and inaction where there should be action, may be discerned in major foreign policy behavior of the post assassination government.

Post Assassination Foreign Policy Shift

We have heard it said that one of the reasons one may have found inaction on the part of the government, such as failure to place road blocks or cut off transportation from the assassination side, by whatever means, may have been due to the fact that there was a traumatization as a result of the assassination. What is revealing, however, is that the same government which has failed to act for over four years on evidence suggesting a conspiracy, actually swing into amazingly fast action in an area where one might have anticipated a slow feeling of the way. The fact is that after the assassination key foreign policy changes were immediately put into effect.

Even considering the fact that the new President's views on foreign policy differed from those of President Kennedy, on the basis of a natural reaction to the death of Kennedy, one might have expected a slower changeover. After all, President Johnson's area of expertise is not foreign policy, and therefore one might have expected caution in changes that may have come. To the contrary, however, extensive changes were in the works shortly after the assassination. In particular there seems to have been an almost immediate change in orientation to the third world. There is much reason to believe the Cold War was dying out in Europe, and that the end of it was to a great extent symbolized by the beginning of new relations with Russia evidenced by Kennedy's Test Ban Treaty. Kennedy had already understood the need for a world built on something more firm than is possible in the context of the Cold War. He saw very clearly his chance to end the Cold War. Drew Pearson, in his Washington Merry-Go-Round column of January 23, 1963 outlined the crossroad at which President Kennedy and humanity had arrived at that critical time:

"President Kennedy today faces his greatest opportunity to negotiate a permanent peace, but because of division inside his own Administration he may miss the boat.

"That is the consensus of friendly diplomats long trained in watching the ebb and flow of world events...

"Here are the reasons why Mr. Kennedy is now sitting on top of the diplomatic world when it comes to settling Berlin and other problems of the cold war..."

Pearson then outlined the then existing conditions which led the United States and Russia to the "brink of agreement." President Kennedy understood these conditions. In his American University address he set them forth:

"Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war...not merely peace for Americans, but peace for all men; not merely peace in our time but peace for all time."
(Sorenson, Theodore C., Kennedy, p. 823,
New York, Harper & Row, 1965.)

Sorenson further tells us, "He challenged his listeners to look anew at the Soviet Union and the Cold War, to put past conflicts and prejudices behind them and to concentrate interests shared by both powers." (Ibid. p. 824.)

President Eisenhower had eloquently warned us of the military-industrial-complex, and its danger to our liberties. If the Cold War would end, this would jar the power of influential figures in the military-industrial-complex, to the munitions and missile interests and the Pentagon.

"The nature of the Cold War Institutional Machine suggests there is little hope in trying to convert it to other purposes. For the body of ideology and techniques that differentiates the staffs of these institutions is highly specific to a military power-based orientation. That is why the problem is one of dismantling, which means folding up the organization and, at the same time, seeking constructive opportunities for the able men and women engaged in these units." (Melman, Seymour, Our Depleted Society, p. 236. New York, Delta, 1965)

Yet, in an important sense the end of the Cold War in Europe was an accomplished fact. In their interesting study After 20 Years, Barnett and Raskin make the following observations:

"We wrote this book because it appears that for the first time in many years a confluence of American, Soviet, and European political interests may now make it possible to end the great confrontation between East and West over the future of Europe. A significant shift in the relations of the super powers to Europe and to each other now seems plausible..." (p.vii)

and

"...economic pressures, such as the gold flow problem, political pressures, such as the anti-Nato campaign of de Gaulle, and technological pressures, such as the growing adolescence of the bases encircling the Soviet Union, are pushing the United States towards unilateral military disengagement. (p. 89)

and

"After the Cuban crisis, the Soviets appeared increasingly interested in a detente based on tacit understanding between principal antagonists. They cut the defense budget and, then, production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons in response to similar moves by the United States..." (p. 90)

Now, if the Cold War ended in Europe, how could the Cold Warriors adjust? They could go out of business, or discover a new theater in which to enact and reproduce the Cold War- that theater would, of course, be the third world- Asia-Africa-Latin America. There is evidence, however, that when Kennedy thought in terms of ending the Cold War in Europe he had no plans for beginning it in the third world. All evidence available that establishes Kennedy was becoming unhappy about Viet Nam in particular, and from all available evidence it is most unlikely that developments would have taken the course they have had Kennedy lived.

Johnson and Foreign Policy

The most important change following the assassination of President Kennedy occurred precisely in the area of foreign policy, particularly with respect to Asia and Latin America. Of course, to note such change is not to prove it was a deliberate consequence of the assassination. Yet as a key variable careful examination of that change becomes necessary, if we wish to understand what is going on. It might be one thing to observe Johnson's orientation to foreign policy is different from Kennedy's, and therefore one could expect such changes. But it is another thing to note at the very moment President Johnson was affirming continuation of Kennedy's program for peace, and searching for means to end the Cold War, momentous changes were being made which would make peace impossible and renew the Cold War. Here was a pattern of

action where we might have expected inaction at least until a longer period of adjustment was realized. This, of course, is not to suggest that President Johnson himself was involved in the assassination. Two observations here are relevant. One is that generally speaking Johnson was more weak in the realm of foreign affairs than in domestic. The second consideration is that his views on foreign policy would still be consistent with the militarists, and his interests would be identified with influential power in the military-industrial-complex. Thus, without implying any guilt of Johnson, it must be realized that if the Cold Warriors wanted to ensure the continuation of the Cold War in a new theater of operation, they could depend upon Johnson, and they could control him where they could not control Kennedy.

William S. White, in The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson, p. 130, Greenwich, Conn. 1964 sets forth Johnson's view on Asia as stated in a memorandum to President Kennedy dated May 23, 1961 following Johnson's visit to the Far East:

"The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there- or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asians Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts-Philippines, Japan, Taiwan- have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.

"The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost...

"There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia." (pp. 153-154)

Johnson stated in 1961 what our policy has become after Kennedy's assassination.

Kennedy and Military Take Over

It may seem irresponsible to conceive of a military plot to eliminate Kennedy, and ensure continuation of the Cold War. However, we must realize for one thing that Kennedy was not only becoming more difficult to control, but he himself, in his position of great authority, and from a vantage point at which there was much information unavailable to us, did not regard a military take-over as implausible. We have an excellent articulation of his feeling on this matter in a discussion with Paul B. Fay, Jr.¹ This colloquy occurred one summer weekend in 1962 on the Honey Fitz, the Kennedy yacht. The President was asked what he thought of the possibility of a military take-over in the United States. The discussion grew out of the book Seven Days in May by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey.

President Kennedy said: "It's possible. It could happen in this country, but the conditions would have to be just right."

The conditions the President outlined were as follows:

- (1) The country would be led by a young President,
- (2) There would be a Bay of Pigs,
- (3) Military criticism of the President would follow,
- (4) Then if there was another Bay of Pigs the military

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1. Fay, Paul B. Jr., The Pleasure of His Company, p. 190.
New York, Harper & Row, 1963.

would consider over-throwing the elected establishment, and finally.

- (5) "Then if there were a third Bay of Pigs, it could happen."

Mr. Fay concluded this episode by describing how the President: "Pausing long enough for all of us to assess the significance of his comment, ...concluded with an old Navy phrase: 'But it won't happen on my watch.'"

These conditions were approximated in the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy was in fact a young President. There was a Bay of Pigs. The missile crisis which followed, resulted not in the bombing of Cuba- as the military advisors had pressed upon the President¹ but rather in a detente with Russia. This was followed by a nuclear test ban treaty which: "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared themselves opposed to...under almost any terms."²

Theodore C. Sorensen further detailed the opposition of the American military to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:

"Confronted with an actual treaty limiting the development of weapons, the Chiefs began to hedge..."

"Repeatedly, and ultimately successfully, Kennedy and McNamara reassured them that underground testing would continue our nuclear progress. Air Force Chief LeMay acknowledged that he would have opposed the treaty had it not already been initialed; and his Strategic Air Command General Thomas Powers flatly denounced it..." -54-

1. Schelsigner, Arthur M., *op. cit.*, p. 896.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 818.

3. Sorensen, Theodore C., *op. cit.*, p. 213.

"The treaty...encountered heavy attack...from... former Chiefs of Staff Arleigh Burke, Arthur Radford and Nathan Twining. The Air Force Association composed of military, former military and defense contractors, came out against it."¹

The American University Speech followed by his reexamination of the Vietnamese policy (to be discussed later)- completely fulfilled the conditions set forth by President Kennedy for a take-over to happen on his watch. In fact, President Kennedy was doing his job right, and he very well knew that doing his job right in Cold War American might cost his life.

"...when he saw Nixon after the Bay of Pigs he said. 'If I do the right kind of a job, I don't know whether I am going to be here four years from now.' Nor could anyone interest him much in details of personal protection. 'If someone is going to kill me,' he would say, 'they are going to kill me.'"²

Kennedy's Quest for Peace Dies with Him

In any event, when President Kennedy was no longer on watch, the quest for peace was crushed. D.F. Flemming, the distinguished scholar on the Cold War, described this critical peace-making phase of President Kennedy and the abrupt end "which was the consequence of his assassination:

"Fortunately, we had in President Kennedy at a new turning point in history a leader with both vision and courage. He had made certain that there were no missile gaps against us. He had won the acclaim of the West by the way he successfully played showdown nuclear politics in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. He had faced the last of man's ultimate decisions on earth.

"Then, in the summer of 1963, Kennedy turned his face resolutely toward life and unmistakably

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1. Sorensen, Theodore C., op. cit. pp. 738-739.
2. Schlesinger, Jr. Arthur M. op. cit. p. 676.

signaled the end of the Cold War. Behind the patriotic facade of nuclear militarism he saw the death of his own children and of all children. In a series of magnificent addresses, he urged us to reconsider our attitudes toward peace, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. He won a treaty ending atomic testing above ground and then paused to wait a little for the more embattled of his cold-war compatriots to catch up with the times.

"At that moment he was struck down..."

"Is this to happen again, for the third and last time? Are we really about to plunge into another twenty years of escalating period of the final world war in a self-defeating effort to control the fringes of China militarily? Should we not rather join in welcoming the great Chinese people belatedly into the twentieth century? And, above all, can we move fast enough really to organize the unity of mankind while there is still time?"¹

In seeking to keep the path of peace open, President Kennedy had reminded us of the ancient Chinese proverb, that a journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step. President Kennedy took that little single step, particularly with the Test Ban Treaty, symbolizing the failure of the Cold War in Europe, but then he was shot dead.

What Johnson Says and What the Military Does

President Johnson said, "To the protestation and enlargement of this new hope for peace I pledge my country, and its government."

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1. Fleming, D.F. "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, p. 137. Philadelphia, 1966.

1. The New York Times, Dec. 2, 1963.

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President Johnson further declared that the assassination of Mr. Kennedy "...did not alter his nation's purpose."¹

But, the nation's purpose with respect to the very matter President Johnson was addressing himself to was already being very substantially altered, and a step backward away from the path of peace was being taken. In September of 1963 President Kennedy had stated that the war was for the Vietnamese to win or lose. It was not to be an American war. Arthur Schlesinger tells us:

"President Kennedy did not believe the war in Vietnam could succeed as a war of white men against Asians. 'It could not be won,' he said, a few weeks before his death, 'unless the people (of South Vietnam) support the effort... We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men as their advisors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam.'"²

And Senator Morse has apprised us of the fact that "Mr. Kennedy told him 10 days before he was felled by an assassin's bullet in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963 that he was reexamining Viet Nam Policy."³

More revealing, however, is what we are told in the excellent study of negotiations, The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam:

"It is important to recall, in this regard, the stated intention of the Kennedy administration, as announced by McNamara and Taylor from the White House on October 2, 1963, which was to withdraw most U.S. Forces from South Vietnam by the end of 1965...."

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1. The New York Times, Dec. 18, 1963.
2. Schlesinger, Jr. Arthur M. A Middle Way out of Vietnam, "New York Times Magazine", Sept. 18, 1966, p. 114.
3. The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 26, 1966.

"Three weeks after the assassination, on December 19 and 20, 1963, McNamara and CIA chief John A. McCone visited Saigon to evaluate the war efforts of the new Saigon government. McNamara told the junta leaders that the United States was prepared to help...as long as aid was needed." (New York Times, January 2, 1964, p. 7)...

"...the United States had made the crucial decision to reverse the policy, announced during the last days of President Kennedy's administration, of gradually withdrawing U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Was it all a coincidence that a change in leadership in Washington was followed by a change in policy, and a change in policy by a corresponding change in Saigon's government?"¹

Thus, at the time President Johnson was assuring the world through the United Nations that he was following in President Kennedy's footsteps in seeking peace and an end to the Cold War, he was in fact and deed adopting policies which would prolong the war in Asia and keep the Cold War boiling. Of course, one could always say that conditions changed and Johnson was forced by them to alter Kennedy's approach- one could say that, but it wouldn't be true. For if conditions changed, they did so in a manner even less conducive to a policy of escalation. The authors of The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam tell us:

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1. Schurmann, Franz, Scott, Peter Dale, and Zelnick, Reginald, The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam, pp. 32-33, Fawcett, N.Y. 1966.

"One conclusion can be asserted unequivocally: The United States increased its commitment to a prolongation of the Vietnam war at a time when the drift of the Saigon junta and of public opinion was in the direction of negotiations for a neutralized Vietnam."¹

Why a Foreign Policy Shift- The Essential Question

Unquestionably then, here again we have definite action in a context which calls for none. That there should have been a change in Vietnamese policy so immediately after the murder of Kennedy when the external situation in Vietnam did not evoke it raises serious questions about what caused it in our internal situation. What is at stake here is not an academic issue, not an argument about technicalities of how the assassination was done, but fundamental questions concerning why it was done. At issue are questions of war and peace that involve the whole of humanity. Not only is it not irresponsible to raise questions concerning why there are basic changes in foreign policy in the administration that is vowing to uphold the peaceful policies of the murdered President, but rather not to raise such questions is to be guilty of reckless cowardice.

If we are wrong in supposing there is a deliberate correlation between the change in foreign policy and the assassination, really little is to be lost except our face, which is not worth one human being's one minute of life. If, however, we are right, there is a
2. Ibid. pp. 32-33.

world to be saved, and the life of the experiment we call man. We are now sinking fast in the magic quicksand of the Vietnamese War led by a man who vows he is supporting the policies of President Kennedy who was in favor of an opposite policy. In the New York Times of November 25, 1967 it was reported that Roger Hilsman, head of Intelligence in the State Department and later Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, resigned from the Johnson Administration in 1964 because President Johnson was planning to ditch the Kennedy policy in favor of a military solution. The New York Times described Hilsman as a "key policy making official in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations." (New York Times, Feb. 26, 1964.)

Arthur Schlesinger, who was a Special Assistant and speech writer for Kennedy has said of Kennedy concerning Vietnam:

"He was somber and shaken. I had not seen him so depressed since the Bay of Pigs. No doubt he realized Vietnam was his great failure in foreign policy, and that he had never really given it his full attention." (New York Times, Nov. 25, 1965.)

Indeed, while the military has been getting a green light from the highest office in our land since the death of Kennedy, such was not the case prior to that tragic event. I.F. Stone calls to our attention the fact that Arhtur Krock in his New York Times column of February 14, 1965 "disclosed for the first time that Kennedy turned down a proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send 40,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam." According to Stone, President Kennedy told Mr. Krock that "he still believed...the U.S. military should not become involved on the Asian mainland."

He emphasized this should be so particularly in "civil disturbances created by guerillas." Stone sums up by saying, "What both Eisenhower and Kennedy refused to do Johnson has now done. He has landed U.S. combat troops in Asia." (I.F. Stone's Weekly, March 15, 1965)

This militarization of our policy was in the planning stages long before it was supposed to have been brought about by external forces. Thus at the very time President Johnson was posing as a peace candidate against Barry Goldwater, Charles Roberts, had informed us in his book LBJ's Inner Circle¹ that he had already planned to escalate the war. The plans to escalate the war to North Vietnam were made, according to this account, in October 1964.

One can never be sure about what a man would have done had he lived longer. Perhaps, President Kennedy would have escalated the war in Vietnam. Yet, the evidence we have, while not by any means air tight, certainly suggests Kennedy would not have militarized the war. It strongly suggests the very opposite. He was not so permissive with the military and mounting questions were raising themselves to him over the war in Vietnam. At the time of his death the door was open to peace in Vietnam. In the light of what appears to have been his changing attitude, there is reason to believe he would at least have explored the possibility of walking through it. After his assassination, however, the door was securely closed.

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1. Roberts, Charles, LBJ's Inner Circle, pp. 20-22,

In their most carefully reasoned work, The United States in Vietnam, Kahin and Lewis assert the following:

"Dien's death initially appeared to open up possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question. Public feeling against the war began to be expressed more openly in Saigon and other cities, and both the politically active Buddhist and student elements advocated pursuit of a neutralist solution to the conflict.

"General Duong Van Minh received a manifesto (dated Nov. 8) from the NLF that called on 'the parties concerned in South Vietnam (to) negotiate with one another to reach a cease-fire...'"¹

The manifesto further advocated a policy of neutrality and the establishment of friendly relations with all countries.

JOHNSON

Johnson's Policy in Vietnam

But the Johnson policy was a quick revision of Kennedy's plan to return troops by 1965. Clearly action was evinced where external conditions did not require any. Whatever the motivation, clearly the Cold War had been moved to Asia.

It cannot be too much emphasized that the definite and deliberate militarization of policy was quickly put into action throughout the Cold War after the death of President Kennedy. There was no evidence of governmental traumatization, no careful reconsideration, but a most efficient and abrupt movement from politico-economic policies to military ones.

"Let us continue" was the motto of the post-assassination government, but efforts for peace were not continued. Where a basis for action in behalf of peace was set into action by the

¹ Kahin, George McTurnan and Lewis, John W., The United States in Vietnam, p. 151f, New York, Delta, 1967.

Kennedy administration, it was discontinued by the Johnson administration. Here, where work had been done in an effort to achieve detente, if there really were a desire to continue the policies of Kennedy action, peace moves, rather than inaction would have been natural.

Kennedy and Normalization of Relations with Cuba

Thanks to a book by William Attwood, The Reds and Blacks,¹ we know President John F. Kennedy responded favorably to Castro's overtures for a resumption of diplomatic relations. President Kennedy approved Attwood's talking to Dr. Carlos Lechunga, the chief Cuban delegate to the United Nations. The result was the idea of setting up private talks with Castro in Cuba. Robert Kennedy actually proposed representatives of the two governments first meet in Mexico. Bundy told Attwood that the President, more than the State Department, was interested in the possible meeting. On November 19 Bundy told Attwood the President wanted to see him immediately after he met with Lechunga. The President, Bundy made clear, would be available, except for "a brief trip to Dallas."

Soon after the assassination, Attwood met Lechunga who told him he had been instructed by Castro on November 23 to begin formal discussion. But, as Attwood makes clear, all efforts for

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1. Attwood, William, The Reds and the Blacks, New York, Harper & Row, 1967.

detente with Cuba died with the President.

Certainly there could have been diplomatic action here to improve relations, and calm down world tensions. Castro was certainly ready for better diplomatic relations. It was reported in the New York Times, January 2, 1964:

"Premier Fidel Castro said yesterday in a telephone interview from Havana that he was 'hopeful' that good relations with the United States might be resumed this year. He added that the next move was up to Washington.

"He said that until President's Kennedy's 'tragic death,' he believed that 'an eventual normalization of relations with the Kennedy administration was possible.

"The Cuban leader said he was uncertain about relations with President Johnson, but emphasized he was 'hopeful.'"

There certainly are interests who are chilled at the thought not of war but peace. There are interests who prefer world tensions, and who would never be satisfied with good relations with Castro. Castro himself was aware of this, and what is interesting is that he explicitly denied John F. Kennedy could be identified with these interests. In a talk with Castro, Jean Daniel was told the following:

"'I believe Kennedy is sincere,' Fidel declared. 'I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance...'" (Daniel, Jean, "Unofficial Envoy," The New Republic, Dec. 14, 1963, p. 17.)

Castro further asserted:

"For years and years American policy- not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon- has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a president arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the lowers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United States no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised...the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him? The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one." (Ibid. p. 19)

So, we see that with the death of Kennedy there is a new approach to the underdeveloped countries of Central and Latin America. Castro did not consider Kennedy an enemy. He looked to him to develop into a great President. Schlesinger speaks further of Castro's views on Kennedy as reported by Jean Daniel:

"He denounced Washington and the CIA. Still, of Kennedy, Castro said he could 'be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev...he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse.'"¹

Castro was right. The new government which took power after Kennedy's death assumed a tough and militaristic approach to the aspirations of the underdeveloped and aspiring nations of the world. After Kennedy's death, the new administration, while avowing to continue his enlightened policies, were among those

1. Schlesinger, Arthur M., op.cit. p. 1000.

who sabotaged his liberal policies in foreign affairs. After the assassination, despite claims to the contrary, there was a thorough going change in our foreign policy with respect to the third world. Vietnam became crucially important. Already on December 14, 1963, military juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras were recognized. And during January and February of 1964 economic and military aid programs were set back in action.

This constituted a direct repudiation of Kennedy's policy of diplomatic, military and economic boycott of the military regimes in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Kennedy's program of boycotting hurt the anti-democratic military leaders. Johnson's program put them back in business. With Johnson, and the bringing into office of Thomas Mann, a new doctrine, the Mann doctrine, meant that the United States would not work against forces of tyranny, against military camps or the right-wing dictatorships. The fight for justice, human rights and social and economic welfare was buried with J.F.K. This humane approach of President Kennedy was quickly changed for the policy of military intervention and support of dictatorship just so long as it wore an anti-communist label.

In the spring of 1964 we saw the storm of overthrowing the Gularat government. This was hailed by President Johnson, and our State Department and played up by our news media as a great triumph for forces of anti communism. I.F. Stone commented:

"Two symbols of the new Johnsonian orientation toward military dictatorship in the hemisphere were confirmed to office by the Senate Feb. 25, in an almost empty chamber, on a voice vote... One was Jack Hood Vaughan to become head of the Peace Corps. The other was Lincoln Gordon to succeed Vaughan as Assistant Secretary

of State for Inter-American Affairs. Vaughn has become an apologist for military take-over. Gordon as Ambassador to Brazil favored the overthrow of its constitutional President by a cabal of the military, the landed oligarchy and urban property."

Stone continued to note:

"Our instant support of the military was regarded as signalling the end of Kennedyism. (as Le. Monde said at the time)..." (I.F. Stone's Weekly, March 7, 1966, p. 3.)

From our perspective, the elimination of Goulart was taken as a great day for democracy. The Nation specified some of the great developments for democracy:

"There have been 8,000 arrests. Forty (or is it sixty by now?) members of the Brazilian congress have been expelled. An old line general is running the show. Everyone who proposed a decent system of taxation, or abolishing illiteracy or enlarging the franchise, or giving land to the peasants, is a communist..." (The Nation, April 27, 1964, p. 406.)

What is significant is not that President Johnson called into office men who might better express his own political style or views, but that powerful interests, particularly those advocating a military hard line, who had to be held in check by Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, were now being given their own way. It is not that the military and the military-industrial complex were not always a threat and danger, and it is not that they always did not exert a tremendous influence, but it is that after the assassination, it seemed almost more as if they were in control rather than merely being influential. In the Dominican Republic hopes for a pro democratic regime were crushed by the active intervention of the United States. Theodore Draper says:

"The evidence is now overwhelming that the '65 pro-Bosch bid for power would have been a bloodless success in the first 36 hours but for the subsequent realization by the Dominican military leaders that the U.S. government did not want them to submit or the revolt to succeed..." ("A Case of Defamation," The New Republic, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 16.)

In a New Republic editorial it was observed: •

"John F. Kennedy in 1962 at the time of the Cuban missile crisis acted only after irrefutable evidence was at hand of Soviet placement of intermediate ballistic missiles in Cuba. Even then, and despite the urgent need for speed, Mr. Kennedy consulted with O.A.S. every step of the way. Moreover he knew his own mind and his advisers knew he knew it, so they could and did push a variety of ideas at him hard. Who is pushing today, and what? When so called "hawks" present their views to Mr. Johnson, they seem to be pushing at an open door, which, however, is denied to less simple-minded suggestions." (The New Republic, May 15, 1965, p. 5.)

The Great Society Equals a Military Society

Now all that is being maintained is that despite pledges to continue the peaceful policies of Kennedy, President Johnson's administration in fact marked a predominance of military influence, and that the Great Society is primarily a Military Society. Increasingly problems are understood in terms of military and police solution rather than philosophical, economic or social ones. And, of course, the Vietnamese war means increasing militarization and brutalization of our society. Dissent, which must be the primary strength of a free society, is becoming more and more fragile. What is of concern is not that after the death of Kennedy new policies were put into effect, but that we seem to be virtually living under a new form of government, one in which no democratic pressures

have effect.

The most frightening thing about the Vietnamese War is not the madness of it which is so often observed, but the method in the madness. No democratic, political, religious, moral protests, not world opinion nor the desire of world leaders nor the Pope has much effect. There is a systematic escalation which has grown every second without any pause since the assassination. This escalation is planned beyond democratic processes. The people in this society have not been granted an opportunity to see relevant evidence concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. If we were free, we would have a right to know what happened to our President.

We are waging a war without the approval of Congress. Irreversible decisions for escalation are made independently of congressional or popular approval. What is frightening is not that after the assassination that new policies were put into effect. That would be natural. What is frightening is that more than ever democracy seems to have been put out of effect. One who regards democracy as a precious way of political life must feel concerned and must seek for the causes of this dangerous situation. No such inquiry could be valid if the question were not raised concerning whether changes were an accidental consequence of the assassination rather a deliberate consequence.

Again, it should be emphasized that to assume the assassination was politically motivated, and aimed at bringing about basic changes in foreign policy, is not at all to make any accusation against President Johnson. We must assume any individual is innocent until prove guilty. What is certain, however, is the fact that if there were powerful interests who desired Kennedy killed to change foreign policy it would have been clear to such interests that Lyndon Johnson would serve them.

Johnson's forte may never have been foreign policy, but at the same time he has been identified with the most frozen elements in the Cold War spectrum. On July 12, 1950 President Johnson in support of Korean war effort called for all out mobilization. Selig S. Harrison points out "Johnson's speech was notable for its total preoccupation with Pentagon details..." (Lyndon Johnson's World, The New Republic, June 13, 1960) Prior to the fall of Dienbienphu, Johnson was in the very hard line camp of John Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford. Harrison points out in speaking of Johnson that

"On January 28, 1955, having returned safely to the Senate, he pushed through for the White House the resolution authorizing the deployment of U.S. armed forces for the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores. He fought the unsuccessful (74-13) Lehman amendment to exempt the off shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the scope of the resolution. Against in 1956, with no election in sight, he went out of his way to stress his agreement with Senator Knowland in reiterating bipartisan opposition to Chinese admittance to the United Nations."

This is not to say President Johnson's entire record in foreign policy is consistently identifiable with a rightest position, but that it shows he could well be used by militant Cold Warriors. One of the valuable services rendered by I.F. Stone has been to criticize Goodwin for promoting the myth Johnson was a dove in 1954. Stone notes:

"As long as Eisenhower pursued a hard line in Latin America as in Asia, he had Johnson's backing. Johnson sponsored the 'Monroe Doctrine' resolution supporting Dulles' efforts to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala. Johnson's only other difference with the Republican administration that year also found him to the right of Ike. Johnson stood with Knowland in asserting that the U.S. would not support the U.N. if it admitted Red China..." (I.F. Stone Weekly, Oct. 3, 1966.)

Johnson has also been a good friend of the C.I.A. In 1956 Johnson, as Majority leader of the Senate, brought tremendous pressure against a bill sponsored by Mansfield and supported by John F. Kennedy to put the C.I.A. under surveillance. The defeat of the bill owed much to the opposition of Johnson. In 1966 President Johnson again stood in strong opposition to efforts to put the C.I.A. under surveillance.

The point is, if the purpose of the assassination was a change in foreign policy, one need not regard Johnson as involved. He could be counted upon to behave subsequently in the "right" way. Powerful interests trust him. Extreme rightist and oil billionaire, H.L. Hunt claims, "I personally intervened to get Lyndon Johnson to take the Vice Presidency." (Robert G. Sherrill, "H.L. Hunt, Portrait of a Super-Patriot," The Nation, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 186.)

And I. Irving Davidson, influential Washington lobbyist representing Latin American dictatorships, told Fulbright in Congressional hearings:

"...and I wanted to do everything in my power that a man like Lyndon would get the Democratic nomination because I knew he understood the threat of Communism in the Western Hemisphere..." (I.F. Stone's Weekly, June 21, 1965)

In the same issue I.F. Stone informs us that Davidson worked on behalf of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua and was a Washington representative for the Murchison's of Texas, who have interests in Haiti and Nicaragua. What is interesting is that when the Justice Department asked Davidson to register as an agent for Joaquin Balaguer, he claimed he was working for the State Department. He said he had been promised a house-cleaning in the Central American section of the State Department to get rid of elements not sufficiently anti-communist. In 1966 he tried to get the Republican nomination for Nixon and the Democratic for Johnson. (Ibid) We suppose; that's really faith in the two party system.

What is significant about this material, we think is this- ever since his American University address Kennedy was not playing the Cold War game well, and certainly that constituted a threat to very powerful interests. Lyndon Johnson could be expected to play the game very well. Such considerations, of course, by no means establish a proof that the assassination was for foreign policy purposes, but they do establish a motive. We think the best motive. The Warren Commission purports to explain the crime of the century, and fails to do as much as to include an account of motivation. That Oswald was not insane but a lonely man who didn't fit in well with society hardly is a consideration which convinces he therefore killed the President. He could have better joined a lonely hearts club. What motivation could there have been for the assassination? If there was a conspiracy to kill the President, one way we would have to attempt to reconstruct motivation after the fact would be in terms of what might have been expected as a result of the assassination coupled with what effort was then made to realize such expectations. Clearly, thinking of the assassination in such terms, we can see one primary element, and that is foreign policy.

Kennedy's Assassination and Foreign Policy Change- a Causal Relationship?

Thus far what we have been saying is that primary changes since the assassination of President Kennedy have been in the area of foreign policy, and on the basis of that we should examine further and more specifically to see if there is a causal relation. We can say that assuming the assassination of President Kennedy had as its purpose fundamental changes in foreign policy, then events subsequent to his murder would have been predictable.

Of course, it must be realized that there is the danger of being guilty of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. We can't say for certainty the changes in foreign policy following upon the death of President Kennedy were caused and were intended to be caused by his murder and as the fulfillment of a plan to murder him. It is even possible that, had Kennedy lived, the war in Vietnam might still have been escalated. For it is most difficult to be confident when one deals with counterfactual conditionals. Yet we can say the weight of evidence suggests Kennedy would never have escalated the war in the manner of the post-assassination powers, and we must also remember we are dealing not with mathematical equations, but with human political ones. Consequently, we can't even expect perfection or certainty. Thus we can say there is certainly reason for concern in the light of the vast changes in foreign policy which were put in motion almost immediately after the assassination.

Methodologically our suspicions are reinforced by the consideration that not only are changes in foreign policy which have taken place predictable, on the assumption of a sinister plan to murder Kennedy to alter his efforts to end the Cold War, but considering subsequent political events, one could almost post dict the assassination. This is particularly the case with respect to Vietnam.

In Vietnam- What the Military Wants it Gets

Vietnam constitutes an especially important area with respect to this behavioral pattern of action where it is not called for and inaction where action is called for. This is so much the case, that critics have regarded the carrying out of the war as irrational or even mad. Yet, no one who carefully studies the history of negotiations could possibly assume irrationality. When we deal with the concept of rationality we are dealing with an idea which

involves adjusting the means so as to get the most efficiency in achieving a given end. If the end of the war in Vietnam may itself be irrational from the standpoint of human standards, in terms of achieving the end of continuing the Cold War, every move is perfectly rational. What dramatically impresses one about the escalation in Vietnam, is the very deliberate, systematic character of it.

Since the President ordered the bombing of North Vietnam, right after his installation into power following the election, there has not been a second in which we have any evidence of hesitation in carrying forth the war. Every day, every week, every month the war grows, and approaches fulfillment of the militarist and cold warrior's dream. Some defenders of Johnson maintain the military doesn't get what it wants. How could it get what it wants? If it were given exactly what it desired all at once national and world opinion would be so outraged as to defeat its purpose. But let the world be fed the pollution and poison of the war in slow stages, and it becomes palatable. Not at once, but step by step, the military gets what it wants. The pattern is all too terrifyingly clear to be denied or ascribed to chance. What the military wants, it gets.

At one time bombing of the North was unthinkable. The military wanted it, and got it.

February 24th, 1965 jets were used for the first time in air strikes. On March 2nd there were conducted the first explicitly non-realiatory raids. On April 7th, in response to mounting concern over the war, Johnson gave the world words of peace, and within four months of that there was a movement of 100,000 men to Vietnam. And during this period of deliberate, systematic escalation, any overture or sign from the other side was ignored or deflected by Rusk's militarily insulated antennae or by the President or others in the administration.

Then we heard of La Pira's conversation with Ho Chi Minh. It took place on November 11th of 1967. Of course, jubilant over a prospect of peace, Rusk's responses to the November 11 conversation came on December 4th. Then came the real response, for on December 15th Haiphong was bombed for the first time. And during our greatly propagandized bombing halt we kept the escalation mounting. We put in over 14,000 men during the 37 day bombing pause, and on January 27th we launched "Operation Masher," the largest amphibious operation by the United States Marines since the 1950 Inchon landing in Korea. And what is significant, considering the pattern of action where there should have been none is that this operation did not come in response to a new attack by the enemy, but in response to a lull.

On June 25, 1966 Chester Renning, eminent Canadian diplomat, was reported to have returned from Hanoi with significant information on Canadian efforts to commence peace talks. Also, Secretary McNamara had informed Senate Armed Services Committee that industries of the North contribute little to supplies used in the South. Yet, at the end of June, with no external basis for such action, we commenced to bomb Hanoi-Haiphong area.